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DIRECT EVIDENCE OF A SHERMAN ACT
AGREEMENT
WILLIAM H. PAGE*
The Supreme Court once said, “[C]ircumstantial evidence is the lifeblood
of antitrust law.”1 That was in a merger case, but the observation could also
apply to price-fixing litigation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Claims of
price fixing and other per se violations of Section 1 usually turn on whether
circumstantial evidence proves that the defendants formed an agreement—the
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” the statute requires.3 Motions for
summary judgment test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence of
agreement.4 Under Matsushita, courts resolving these motions usually rely on
a framework of “plus factors”5 to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s circumstan-
tial evidence raises a plausible inference of agreement, one that “tends to ex-
clude the possibility”6 the defendants were simply pricing interdependently, as
oligopolists typically (and lawfully) do.7 Under Twombly, courts faced with
* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I thank
participants in my law school’s summer workshop for helpful comments on an earlier version of
this article.
1 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973) (White, J.).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1. One of the cases Falstaff cited as authority for its “lifeblood” claim was
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939), a seminal case on proof of
agreement under Section 1 by circumstantial evidence.
3 See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991) (“[T]he essence of any
violation of § 1 is the illegal agreement itself—rather than the overt acts performed in further-
ance of it.”).
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”).
5 See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“[P]rice fixing plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of ‘plus factors’ that remove their evi-
dence from the realm of equipoise and render that evidence more probative of conspiracy than of
conscious parallelism.”).
6 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
7 See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396–98 (3d Cir.
2015) (“Although we have not identified an exhaustive list of plus factors, they may include (1)
evidence that the defendant had a motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that
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motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, evaluate the plausibility of
inferring agreement from circumstantial evidence the complaint alleges.8
In these cases, courts usually begin by saying that, as usual in Sec-
tion 1 cases, the plaintiff has no direct evidence of agreement—evidence
like a “recorded phone call”9 that is “explicit and requires no infer-
ences to establish” that the necessary direct communications occurred.10
Direct evidence is rare, they explain, because conspirators, fearing detection
and penalties, will try hard not to create any.11 Even with access to dis-
the defendant acted contrary to its interests; and (3) evidence implying a traditional conspiracy.”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted); ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, PROOF OF CONSPIR-
ACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 82–106 (2d ed. 2019) [hereinafter PROOF OF CONSPIR-
ACY] (surveying 9 commonly cited plus factors); William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 414–35 (2011) (arguing for recognition of a
set of “super plus factors” that strongly indicate agreement).
8 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring the complaint to
allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Twombly inter-
preted FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing mo-
tions for failure of the complaint “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under the
standard of Rule 8(a)). See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 n.22 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding Twombly “necessarily rejected the proposition that plaintiffs may plead con-
spiracy on the basis of mere parallelism—and thus necessarily required the pleading of plus
factors . . . although a plaintiff still need not plead specific evidence.”).
9 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2013).
Other common hypothetical examples include “an admission by an employee of one of the con-
spirators, that officials of the defendants had met and agreed explicitly on the terms of a conspir-
acy to raise price,” In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010)
(Posner, J.); “a document or conversation explicitly manifesting the existence of the agreement in
question,” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 324 n.23 (3d Cir. 2010); and
“documents, meetings, and participant testimony . . . that the defendants exchanged commit-
ments or otherwise collaborated by some means other than to make a marketplace decision,”
6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 70 (4th ed. 2017).
10 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Theatre En-
ters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 539–40 (1954) (“Admittedly, there is no
direct evidence of illegal agreement . . . .”); Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc.,
490 F. App’x 492, 497 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Given the relatively lighter burden afforded to a plaintiff
putting forth direct evidence of concerted action, the difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence in an antitrust case assumes heightened significance.”).
11 See, e.g., Citigroup, 709 F.3d at 136 (“[I]n many antitrust cases, this type of ‘smoking gun’
can be hard to come by, especially at the pleading stage.”); Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon
Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Direct evidence is extremely rare in anti-
trust cases and is usually referred to as the ‘smoking gun.’”) (quoting InterVest, Inc. v. Bloom-
berg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2003)); United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 68 (2d Cir.
2006) (“[C]onspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all
aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with [ ] precision.”); In re Plywood Antitrust
Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[S]olemnized covenants to conspire are difficult to
come by in any price fixing case.”); Gen. Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 1233
(5th Cir. 1980) (“Even a successful antitrust plaintiff will seldom be able to offer a direct evi-
dence of a conspiracy and such evidence is not a requirement.”); S. Side Drive-In Co. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures Distrib. Co., 30 F.R.D. 32, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (“It is virtually impossible to prove
a conspiracy of this nature by direct evidence; it must usually be done circumstantially.”).
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covery, plaintiffs usually fail to find any direct evidence, despite their best
efforts.12
When plaintiffs claim to have found direct evidence, the courts usually dis-
agree and treat all of the plaintiff’s evidence as circumstantial.13 But, as I will
show, courts sometimes do find that plaintiffs have produced (or pleaded)
direct evidence of agreement. A close look at these cases, I argue, helps clar-
ify what courts mean by a Section 1 agreement and how they expect plaintiffs
to prove that one exists.
In the next Part, I consider the relationships among the concepts of direct
evidence, agreement, and sufficiency. In Part II, I show that, in general, courts
place evidence on the spectrum of direct and circumstantial based on how
completely and clearly the evidence represents the alleged agreement. I also
show how that same choice affects the courts’ analysis of the sufficiency of
the evidence (or allegations) on motions for summary judgment and motions
to dismiss. In Part III, I examine decisions in each of the categories of evi-
dence that courts have characterized as direct—documents, recordings, testi-
mony, and admissions. Finally, I argue that, even when direct evidence is not
present, the courts’ applications of the concept of direct evidence can provide
a model for evaluating the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of communi-
cations as a decisive plus factor in the proof of agreement. Circumstantial
evidence then becomes, as some courts have said, “proxies for direct
evidence.”14
I. DEFINING AGREEMENT AND PROVING AGREEMENT
The decisive issue in most antitrust cases alleging one of the per se offenses
is the existence of an agreement among the defendants to eliminate competi-
tion among themselves or to exclude a rival. Straightforward as it sounds, this
issue is extraordinarily complex, both legally and factually. If the case sur-
vives a motion to dismiss, the process of discovery and decision (or settle-
ment) can take years, at great expense to the parties and the court. And there
is a lot at stake—some of these cases are bet-the-company affairs, in which
the bets depend on the parties’ estimates of their chances of success on the
issue of agreement at critical stages of the litigation. There are both factual
12 See, e.g., In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 804 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
(“Any direct evidence of the agreement will only be uncovered through discovery.”).
13 See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872–79 (7th Cir. 2015)
(finding emails describing a price increase as “col[l]usive” were too ambiguous to be either
direct evidence or even sufficient circumstantial evidence); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup
Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (finding evidence of commu-
nication was too ambiguous to be direct, but, viewed with other circumstantial evidence, raised
an inference of agreement) (Posner, J.).
14 See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).
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and legal reasons for the intractability of the issue, but the concept, if not the
reality, of direct evidence can play a role at every stage of the process.
A. WHAT IS AN AGREEMENT?
To identify direct evidence of an agreement, courts need to know what a
Section 1 agreement is. The Supreme Court has made clear that agreement is
not merely interdependent parallel conduct like oligopoly pricing—what
economists call tacit collusion. In Valspar, the Third Circuit recently summa-
rized the familiar rationale for excluding this sort of noncompetitive conduct
from the reach of Section 1:
“[O]ligopolistic rationality” can cause supracompetitive prices because it
discourages price reductions while encouraging price increases. A firm is
unlikely to lower its price in an effort to win market share because its com-
petitors will quickly learn of that reduction and match it, causing the first
mover’s profits to decline and a subsequent decline in the overall profits of
the industry. Similarly, if a firm announces a price increase, other market
participants will know that if they do not increase their prices to the first-
mover’s level, the first-mover may be forced to reduce its price to their
level. Because each of the other firms know this, each will consider whether
it is better off when all are charging the old price or the new one. They will
obviously choose the new price when they believe that it will maximize
industry profits.15
Even though this sort of conduct means consumers pay more, the court con-
tinued, it is not a Sherman Act agreement because it would be “impossible” to
“order a firm to set its prices without regard to the likely reactions of its
competitors.”16
Under Twombly, if the plaintiff alleges facts that raise only an inference of
“oligopolistic rationality,” the defendant is entitled to a dismissal for failure to
state a claim.17 If the plaintiff manages to allege an agreement but is only able
to find evidence of oligopoly behavior during discovery, then the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment under Matsushita.18 In both settings, the plain-
tiff must produce something more—allegation or evidence—that raises a
plausible inference of agreement.
15 Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 873 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2017)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
16 Id. at 191–92 (quoting Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.).
17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (“Without more, parallel conduct
does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point
does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.”).
18 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21 (1986)
(“[C]onduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does
not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”).
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But courts are not very specific about what a Sherman Act agreement is.
The Supreme Court in Twombly recognized that an agreement may be “tacit
or express,”19 but never explained what that meant. What distinguishes agree-
ment from simple oligopoly cannot be a “unity of purpose, a common design
and understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a conscious commitment to a
common scheme,”20 because rivals can reach that kind of mutual understand-
ing by lawful oligopoly behavior, or tacit collusion.21 The meaning of horizon-
tal agreement only becomes clear in the numerous decisions of the federal
courts classifying conduct as either an agreement or mere interdependence.22
Those cases show that what matters is whether the rivals reached their under-
standing by privately communicating about their assurances or intentions
about future competitive conduct.
Rivals form express agreements by privately exchanging promises about
their future actions.23 The Supreme Court apparently had this category in mind
when it suggested that parallel conduct is unlawful if the evidence shows it is
pursuant to a “preceding agreement”24—in other words, if the parties formed a
complete verbal agreement, then put it into effect. “Tacit agreement” has been
harder to define, but I have argued that parties form a tacit agreement by
privately communicating their intentions (for example on pricing), then con-
firming their expressions of intent by subsequent actions.25 The parties coordi-
nate their interdependent behavior by private communications of their intent,
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
20 W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted).
21 See LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 34 (2013).
22 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013)
(stating that “[t]he ultimate existence of an ‘agreement’ under antitrust law . . . is a legal conclu-
sion” based on inferences from evidence).
23 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the
Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 179 (1993)
(defining agreement as a “process to which the law objects: a negotiation that concludes when
the firms convey mutual assurances that the understanding they reached will be carried out”).
24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“[W]hen allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to
make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding
agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.”).
25 William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 81 ANTITRUST L.J.
593, 597–98 (2017). See, e.g., White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 2011)
(defining tacit agreement as “‘uniform behavior among competitors, preceded by conversations
implying that later uniformity might prove desirable or accompanied by other conduct that in
context suggests that each competitor failed to make an independent decision.’”) (quoting Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996)). For another recent analysis of tacit agreement,
see Wentong Zheng, A Knowledge Theory of Tacit Agreement, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 399
(2019).
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not by acting with mutual awareness of market conditions or by publicly com-
municating with the market, as they would in the case of tacit collusion.26
So, the distinguishing feature of both forms of horizontal agreement is pri-
vate communication among rivals about their future actions:27 communication
of promises in the case of express agreement, and communication of competi-
tive intentions in the case of tacit agreement. Not every kind of private com-
munication will form either kind of agreement—only those that serve no
benign purpose. Courts now view tacit collusion as normal, rational, and una-
voidable conduct by oligopolists. Consequently, private communications
among rivals that have a beneficial purpose, like those in most trade associa-
tion meetings, are also part of the same lawful process. Whenever courts clas-
sify rivals’ communications as beneficial or (plausibly) collusive, they make a
policy decision that further shapes the definition of agreement.28
B. THE PROBLEM OF PROVING AGREEMENT
These definitions of a Sherman Act agreement and their associated commu-
nications help explain the factual challenges of proving agreement mentioned
earlier. The legal standard guides which factual issues are “of consequence in
determining the action,” and therefore what evidence will be relevant in
26 See, e.g., In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 984 (N.D. Ohio
2015) (“[D]irect and secret price discussion between competitors is more probative of a conspir-
acy than are indirect and public communications, ostensibly undertaken by the conspiring com-
petitors to ‘signal’ to one another.”). For discussion of public signaling more generally, see
William H. Page, Signaling and Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in GLOBAL
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS:  CURRENT ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND LAW & ECONOMICS 81 (Douglas
H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, eds. 2016).
27 See, e.g., In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1373
(N.D. Ga. 2017) (observing that “invitations to collude” that supported a finding of conspiracy
have “almost universally been private communications, not public disclosures like the [defen-
dant’s] comments at issue in this case,” which were “made publicly on a quarterly earnings call
with [defendant’s] analysts and investors [and] concerned a topic that was of interest to the
airline industry at the time”), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 714 F. App’x 986
(11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 827 (2019). Delta/Airtran acknowledged that “public
remarks” might support liability if they served no public purpose. Id.  For analysis of documen-
tary evidence of communication through a semipublic intermediary, see In re Domestic Drywall
Antitrust Litig., 163 F. Supp. 3d 175, 248 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (analyzing evidence that defendants
“communicat[ed] sensitive information to [analysts] only for those analysts to reprint that infor-
mation verbatim in reports that other Defendants obtained”); see also Page, supra note 25, at 633
(“In rare instances [ ] the content and context of a formal public announcement may make it
functionally private, without a comparable consumer benefit.”) (discussing cases).
28 See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 910 F.3d 927, 938–39 (7th Cir. 2018)
(finding 20 calls between rivals around the time of a price increase were “not enough” to suggest
an agreement, because “[w]e cannot put much stock in the frequency of contacts, given the
amount of [legitimate] trading that was taking place among the firms”).  The court added that
“we hesitate to impugn the companies’ intentions solely from the timing of the contacts,” and the
plaintiffs’ “speculation about the content of the frequent interfirm contacts is not enough to
create a jury issue.” Id. at 939.
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resolving the issues.29 Because rivals can only form an agreement by commu-
nicating, the most obviously relevant and probative evidence will in some way
represent those very communications. But, because the communications must
be private, evidence of them will be sparse. Conspirators have hefty incen-
tives to leave no vestiges of their actions—by avoiding email and other dura-
ble media and hoping their co-conspirators live by the ancient creed that if
nobody talks, everybody walks. And, sadly, conspirators who do find direct
evidence of agreement in their files may be tempted to destroy it.30
Nevertheless, despite their best efforts, conspirators sometimes do leave
traces, particularly if the conspiracy is among large corporations. Participants
may talk.31 Participants may tell others, who may talk. Modern leniency pro-
grams can create pressure on individual conspirators to break ranks and testify
before a grand jury.32 Conspirators, perhaps surprisingly, may leave an elec-
tronic trail. They may also give directions to employees, who then may leave
records. As I show in more detail below, these traces can provide direct or
very good circumstantial evidence of the agreement.
Parties shape their pleadings, discovery, and trial strategies with the con-
cept (or hope) of direct evidence in mind.33 They know what can happen if the
plaintiff discovers evidence the court will see as direct. And the issues they
face at trial and on motions to dismiss, motions to compel production, and
motions for summary judgment all recognize direct evidence, or less specific
evidence of communications, might exist. Invariably, some of the document
requests will focus on the defendants’ records of communications, or even
29 FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in deter-
mining the action.”).
30 See, e.g., GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming
sanctions for spoliation where evidence showed an executive “deliberately deleted an unknown
number of emails in response to ‘pending [antitrust] litigation’ and urged others to do the same”);
In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 06-0620, 2012 WL 5199388, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 22, 2012) (affirming magistrate judge’s award of sanctions for spoliation against a party
who “suppressed relevant documents within its control . . . after it was reasonably foreseeable
Plaintiffs would seek the documents”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Auto Parts Industry
Executive Pleads Guilty to Obstruction of Justice (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing guilty pleas to
charges defendants “conspired . . . to delete emails and electronic records and to destroy docu-
ments referring to communications with competitors, in contemplation of a federal
investigation”).
31 Cf. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANAC (1735) (“Three may keep a secret if
two of them are dead.”), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 211 (Jennifer Speake
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 6th ed. 2015)).
32 See generally Robert B. Bell & Kristin Millay, The Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency
Program: Learn from the Past or Be Condemned to Repeat It, 34 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2019).
33 See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS
TO PROOF 81 (1984) (“The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is critical to
fact investigation. If one has direct evidence, one need not analyze it in order to determine what
element it establishes.”).
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references to communications that may arguably meet the standard for direct
evidence.34
But the task of finding it is daunting. Discovery may require the most ad-
vanced technological means to review the voluminous electronically stored
information in defendants’ and third parties’ files.35 Although there are proce-
dural and technological means to control costs,36 the process is inevitably ex-
pensive and time consuming. Document “retention” policies can hinder the
search and may raise issues of their own.37 Bare lists of the relevant evidence
of communications in a Section 1 case can run many pages.38 Throughout the
process, both the parties and the court are looking for direct evidence of
34 See, e.g., In re Dairy Farmers of Am. Cheese Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir.
2015) (Appellants “merely request leave to cast a wider net with the apparent hope that, with it,
they would uncover direct evidence of conspiracy.”); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782
F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing discovery focused “on the information exchange
orchestrated by the trade association, the change in the defendants’ pricing structures and the
defendants’ ensuing price hikes, and the possible existence of the smoking gun”); In re Nat’l
Ass’n of Music Merchs. Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2121, 2011
WL 3702453 at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (“Discovery should be limited to who attended or
participated in meetings alleged in the amended consolidated complaint and what was said or
agreed to there.”); Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 263, 265–66 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (requiring plaintiffs to disclose to defendants secret recordings of conversations that
allegedly “reveal that defendants have been caught ‘red handed,’ and that the statements expose a
price-fixing scheme that ‘unambiguously’ violates federal antitrust law”).
35 See, e.g., Tracy Greer, Senior Counsel, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Presentation at
the ABA Spring Meeting, Avoiding E-Discovery Accidents & Responding to Inevitable Emer-
gencies: A Perspective from the Antitrust Division 1, 9 (Mar. 2017), www.justice.gov/atr/page/
file/953381/download.
36 See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanaugh, The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: The Path to Meaningful Containment of Discovery Costs in Antitrust Litigation?, ANTI-
TRUST SOURCE (Apr. 2014) (arguing that the proportionality standard, judicial management,
cooperative planning by counsel, and “prompt resolution of discovery disputes, especially those
involving electronic discovery” can contain costs), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/pub
lishing/antitrust_source/apr14_full_source.pdf.
37 How courts view evidence of actual destruction of files depends on the circumstances.
Compare In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that
one executive’s request that another “delete several emails in the chain” was “consistent with his
not wanting to be detected by his superiors criticizing their management of the company” and did
not suggest spoliation) with In re Korean Ramen Antitrust Litig., 281 F. Supp. 3d 892, 903 (N.D.
Cal. 2017) (finding that sanctions were unwarranted but, “construing the evidence in plaintiffs’
favor, there is an inference that defendants intended or otherwise benefitted from the destruction
of adverse evidence under their existing or newly implemented document destruction policies”).
Cf. Trist v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 466 F. Supp. 578, 589–90 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that
evidence of spoliation would not by itself support an inference of conspiracy but might do so if
considered with plaintiff’s other evidence).
38 See, e.g., In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2437 & 13-MD-2437, 2019
WL 3254090, at *3–23 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2019) (providing a “[f]actual chronology relating to
alleged conspiratorial conduct,” with references to exhibits); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust
Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 1007–21 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (summarizing “[c]ommunications be-
tween and among Defendants” in an appendix).
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agreement, but courts are not surprised if the plaintiff fails to produce it.39 In
that case, as I show in Part IV, courts on motions for summary judgment want
to see the next best thing, some noneconomic circumstantial evidence of com-
munication that suggests agreement.
C. WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS DIRECT EVIDENCE?
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not mention direct or circum-
stantial evidence, courts rely on the distinction in a variety of contexts, includ-
ing Section 1 conspiracy cases.  In doing so, they usually state the familiar
distinction between direct evidence, which requires “no inferences” to estab-
lish a fact in issue (like agreement), and circumstantial evidence, which re-
quires inferences.40 But, as others have long recognized, “All evidence
depends upon some inferences.”41
39 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig. (II), MDL No. 1942, 2012 WL 5383346, at *4 n.3 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 1, 2012) (“Although Defendants assign importance to the lack of direct evidence of
conspiracy after voluminous discovery, several courts have noted that ‘smoking guns’ are rare in
antitrust conspiracy cases.”); Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 290, 337 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (“As in most price-fixing cases, the Defendants have not admitted that they fixed prices,
and discovery has not unearthed direct evidence of an agreement to do so.”), aff’d, 166 F.3d 581
(3d Cir. 1999). Courts will not infer spoliation simply because a search fails to produce direct
evidence. See, e.g., In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311
(N.D. Ga. 2011) (“Just because these e-mails and other documents that were produced by Delta
may not be as helpful to Plaintiffs’ theory of the case as Plaintiffs would like, it does not follow
that other, more incriminating documents existed but were destroyed.”).  For an early example,
see E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914) (“[I]t is
said that in order to show a combination or conspiracy within the Sherman Act some agreement
must be shown [but] [i]t is elementary [ ] that conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct
testimony and may be inferred from the things actually done . . . .”).
40 Many courts state or quote the “no inferences” formulation. See, e.g., Llacua v. W. Range
Ass’n, 930 F.3d 1161, 1174 n.24 (10th Cir. 2019); Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., 771
F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 324 n.23 (3d
Cir. 2010); Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226 (4th Cir.
2004); InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2003); Cty. of Tuolumne v.
Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). But cf. In re High Fructose Corn
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (suggesting the district
court “judge may have been confused by the [“no inferences”] language found in” Baby Food (In
re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)), and suggesting instead that
direct evidence is “tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt”). Courts also distinguish direct
and circumstantial (or indirect) in other antitrust contexts. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (“Direct evidence of anticompetitive effects would [include] re-
duced output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the relevant market,” while “[i]ndirect
evidence would be proof of market power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms
competition.”); see also Lyman Ray Patterson, The Types of Evidence: An Analysis, 19 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 5–8 (1965) (distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence in functional terms). Some
sources limit it to eyewitness testimony. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 675 (10th ed.
2014) (“Evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a
fact without inference or presumption.”).
41 DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES TO THE COURTROOM 15 (4th ed. 2018).
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Our brains function by gathering sense impressions, integrating those im-
pressions into meaningful patterns, and drawing inferences from those pat-
terns. Sometimes this process happens so quickly and intuitively that the
inferences are hard to detect; we call the resulting evidence “direct” evi-
dence. Other times the inferences are more obvious and we call the evidence
“circumstantial.” But there is no clear line between direct and circumstantial
evidence.42
Richard Greenstein similarly writes that “all testimony requires interpreta-
tion—i.e., inferences—to give it meaning; consequently, the connection be-
tween direct evidence and the ‘material fact’ it ‘proves’ is every bit as
inferential as is the case with circumstantial evidence.”43
A factfinder cannot travel back in time to experience an event, and, even if
it could, it would be limited to a single perspective. Its only access to the
event is by inference from traces provided by witnesses, documents, and
physical objects that have some connection to the event. But none of this
evidence can represent the event’s full complexity. The language of oral testi-
mony or written documents, and the images and sounds in video or sound
recordings, will inevitably reduce the event in ways that introduce ambiguities
and therefore require inference. Testimony may summarize past actions or
conversations, or leave the content, dates, or participants in conversations un-
specified. Even verbatim accounts or recordings leave room for interpretation
of what the speakers (or writers) meant in a prior context, with all the cues
that were available then. Even a signed “agreement” among rivals is not itself
the agreement, but evidence of the agreement, evidence that will leave some
room for interpretation.
These observations are especially true for the “fact” of a Sherman Act
agreement. The term “direct evidence” can refer to the proof of any fact,
while “direct evidence of agreement” requires evidence of a complex set of
related facts.44 Parties form an agreement only by a series of communications
that bring them to a common understanding on terms the law forbids. The
ultimate issue of agreement will require an inference of whether the commu-
nications brought the parties to the necessary mental state, or whether they
had some benign purpose. If the direct evidence is in the form of an admis-
sion, interpreting any ambiguity in its phrasing will also require inference.
Courts often reject plaintiffs’ attempts to characterize evidence as direct on
these grounds, relegating the evidence to the circumstantial category.45
42 Id.
43 Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1801, 1807 (2009).
44 As I show later, some courts use “weak direct evidence of agreement” to characterize direct
evidence of fewer than all of the elements of or participants in an illegal agreement. See infra
note 79.
45 See infra notes 188–189.
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Nevertheless, from a legal realist perspective, “direct evidence” exists, be-
cause courts routinely find it in litigation.46 Courts classify evidence pragmati-
cally: evidence is direct if it proves facts with few and obvious inferences.
Some courts suggest that evidence forms a kind of continuum, depending
upon the number and character of the inferences it requires to find a fact in
issue:
When judges and lawyers refer to “direct” evidence, they are simply using
shorthand to refer to evidence that is on the stronger end of the continuum,
and when they refer to “circumstantial” evidence, they are likewise using
shorthand to refer to evidence that is on the weaker end of the continuum.
Thus, “direct” evidence is not the opposite of “circumstantial” evidence; it
is, instead, very strong circumstantial evidence.47
As I show in Part III, courts regularly characterize the least ambiguous evi-
dence, whatever its form, as direct.
The parties’ competing interpretations of evidence can also influence
courts’ classifications. One court, for example, recognized that “[a]lthough it
is possible to construct ambiguity in almost any statement,” the plaintiffs’
evidence was direct because the defendants could “not offer us any other dis-
crete interpretation of this statement that would move it into the category of
circumstantial evidence.”48 In other words, evidence of agreement is direct if
the only reasonable inference from it is that the defendants agreed. Even if the
evidence requires an inference, the defendant must show that the ambiguity
raises a reasonable competing inference that the defendants’ actions were not
conspiratorial.
46 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law.”). Cf. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 779 (2013)
(characterizing Holmes as “a precursor of Realism because he believed that legal categories and
legal doctrine were the best sources of prediction of judicial behavior”).
47 Darke v. Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041 (D. Minn. 2008). See
also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner,
J.) (describing direct evidence as “tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt” and circumstantial
evidence as “everything else including ambiguous statements”); Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 894, 903 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987) (observing that “[a]ll evidence falls some-
where along a continuum between the irrelevant and the conclusive,” but in antitrust law direct
evidence has the “particularized meaning” of “oral or written communications in which defend-
ants expressly discussed the creation or maintenance of [an illegal agreement like] exclusive
territories”). Cf. Snider v. Greater Nevada, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-00583-RCJ-RAM, 2009 WL
3319802, at *9 (D. Nev. 2009) (comparing comments that are direct evidence of discriminatory
animus with “stray remarks” at the “other end of the spectrum” that are only circumstantial
evidence).
48 Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1083 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Courts often characterize direct evidence as a “smoking gun.”49 On the sur-
face, the metaphor doesn’t work, because a smoking gun in the hands of a
suspect is only circumstantial evidence that the suspect shot anyone.50 But it
makes sense as a reference to Watergate. Of the hundreds of times federal
courts have applied the smoking gun metaphor to direct evidence, all of them
apparently have occurred since Watergate became a household word.51 In the
parlance of that scandal, the notorious “smoking gun” was a White House
tape of a conversation in “June 1972 in which Nixon and his chief of staff,
H.R. Haldeman, concocted a plan to instruct the deputy chief of the [CIA] to
tell the FBI director to call off the bureau’s probe into the Watergate bur-
glary.”52 The tape required some inferences to prove a conspiracy to obstruct
justice, but not many. As we will see, similar recordings sometimes exist in
antitrust cases.53
49 See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2010)
(describing direct evidence as “the smoking gun in a price-fixing case”); Petruzzi’s IGA Super-
markets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating “plaintiff in a
section 1 case does not have to submit direct evidence, i.e., the so-called smoking gun”); Aladdin
Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1117 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Rarely, if ever, can a plaintiff
point to a ‘smoking gun’ in [conspiracy] cases [so] a plaintiff must convince the court that it is
reasonable to infer the existence of the gun from the facts shown.”); In re Pork Antitrust Litig.,
No. 18-1776 (JRT/LIB), 2019 WL 3752497, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2019) (“Courts must often
consider whether complaints which fall short of alleging the ‘smoking gun’ nevertheless allege
sufficient circumstantial facts to plausibly establish that defendants agreed to engage in the given
anticompetitive conduct.”); Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 16–cv–02611–RBJ, 2018 WL
1316979 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2018) (“Where there is no ‘smoking gun’ to establish an agreement,
courts assess whether complaints contain sufficient circumstantial evidence of an agreement.”).
50 See, e.g., Petruzzi’s, Inc., 998 F.2d at 1229 n.4 (“[C]ontrary to popular thought a smoking
gun might be mere circumstantial evidence unless the witness saw it fired.”); In re Processed
Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1048 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“A ‘smoking gun,’ in
truth, is circumstantial evidence of a shooting as it requires certain additional inferences, namely,
seeing the post–trigg[e]r pulling, puffs of smoke and deducing the immediate preceding
events.”). The phrase apparently has its origin in the Sherlock Holmes story, “The Gloria Scott,”
in which a murder suspect is described holding a “smoking pistol” when the narrator entered the
room. See William Safire, The Way We Live Now: 1-26-03: On Language; Smoking Gun, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 26, 2003).
51 But cf. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 640 (1947) (illustrating the meaning of “testi-
mony to the overt act” under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, by a hypothetical witness who testified he
heard a “report” and saw “a smoking gun in the hand of defendant and [saw] the victim fall”).
52 Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CAL. L. REV.
1277, 1303 (2018) (citations omitted).
53 Courts commentators also use a meeting in a “smoke-filled room” as a traditional paradigm
of cartel behavior. The anachronistic smoke in the room lends a suggestion of villainy. In re
Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
(“Plaintiffs need not allege the existence of collusive communications in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ in
order to state a § 1 Sherman Act claim.”); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148
F.R.D. 297, 316 (N.D. Ga. 1993).(“The conspiracy that plaintiffs charge in the present action is
far from the traditional price fixing case where competitors meet in ‘smoke-filled rooms’ to set
prices and agree on retaliatory consequences.”); Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the
Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 164–65 (“[I]n antitrust, plaintiffs are rarely
invited to the proverbial smoke-filled rooms in which price-fixing conspiracies are hatched.”);
George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 452
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D. WHY DOES DIRECT EVIDENCE MATTER? CREDIBILITY
VERSUS SUFFICIENCY
As the last section explained, there is no bright line in principle between
direct and circumstantial evidence, because all evidence requires inferences or
“interpretation” by both the witness and the factfinder;54 the distinction is be-
tween shorter or longer chains of inference. Why then make the distinction at
all? Why not focus only on the strength of the inferences or the probative
value of the evidence?55 One answer lies in the role of the court in evaluating
the legal sufficiency of evidence, especially on motions for summary
judgment.
First, consider the factfinder’s role in evaluating evidence. After a bench
trial in the Apple eBooks civil litigation, the district court cited “powerful
direct evidence corroborated by compelling circumstantial evidence” that Ap-
ple had participated in a conspiracy with book publishers.56 It pointed to Steve
“Jobs’ admissions . . . in contemporaneous e-mails pulled from the files of
Apple, the Publishers, Amazon, and others; in the web of telephone calls
among Publisher Defendants’ CEOs surrounding each turning point in the
presentation and execution of the Agreements [with Apple]; and as compel-
lingly, in the circumstantial evidence.”57 This catalog includes several proto-
typical forms of direct evidence—admissions, text communications, and
testimony of participants—but adds circumstantial evidence, which the court
emphasized was just as compelling as direct evidence.58 The court could have
explained its findings just as easily without the distinction. Similarly, some
(1982) (“The prototype of formal collusion is the smoke-filled room in which all the rivals en-
gage in face-to-face communication, although in an era of conference calls and computers that
can talk to one another, less dramatic settings can be employed to the same end.”).
54 Greenstein, supra note 43, at 1804 (“All facts are a function of interpretation, and this
unavoidability of interpretation makes all facts a matter of inference and all evidence, whether
called ‘direct” or “circumstantial,’ nothing more or less than a contribution to that inferential
process.”).
55 See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661–62 (7th Cir.
2002) (describing the “distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence” as “confusing
(and, as it seems to us, largely if not entirely superfluous)”).
56 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 697 (S.D.N.Y 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290
(2d Cir. 2015).
57 Id. at 693.
58 Circumstantial evidence can be far more probative. See, e.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s
Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (“Perhaps on average circumstan-
tial evidence requires a longer chain of inferences, but if each link is solid, the evidence may be
compelling—may be more compelling than eyewitness testimony, which depends for its accu-
racy on the accuracy of the eyewitness’s recollection as well as on his honesty.”); Kevin Jon
Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 252–55
(2006) (presenting data showing DNA or ballistics evidence is far more reliable than eyewitness
identifications); BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 33, at 80 (“[D]og tracks in the mud,” are more
probative than “the sworn testimony of 100 witnesses that no dog passed by.”) (quoting WILLIAM
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 212 (4th ed. 1971)).
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courts instruct juries that they should consider all evidence regardless of the
distinction between direct and indirect.59 In doing so, juries are free to weigh
the evidence and to assess witnesses’ credibility.60 Whether they are good at
these tasks is a separate issue.61
The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is far more im-
portant in resolving motions that test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
case. As I show in more detail in the next Part, in per se cases that turn on the
issue of agreement, the court’s only task on a summary judgment motion is to
decide whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, “tends to exclude” simple interdependence62 and raises a “plausible” in-
ference of tacit or express agreement.63 The court must accept plaintiff’s
evidence as true, especially any direct evidence, whose probative value hinges
on its credibility or weight.64 If inferences from evidence are few and obvious,
59 FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, Instruction 1.12 (2017 rev.)
(“The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial
evidence. You should decide how much weight to give to any evidence. In reaching your verdict,
you should consider all the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence.”), www.
ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_cir_civil_instructions.pdf. See also ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES, B-3 (2005
ed.) (“Direct proof of an agreement may not be available. A conspiracy may be disclosed by the
circumstances or by the acts of the members. Therefore, you may infer the existence of an agree-
ment from what you find the alleged members actually did, as well as from the words they
used.”).
60 See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 582 (1997) (argu-
ing that the justice “system has become more and more willing over time to declare that the
jury—and not the oath—has the job of screening untrustworthy evidence from the decisionmak-
ing process”).
61 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 58, at 244 (“[R]esearch . . . has consistently found that jurors
dramatically undervalue circumstantial evidence and just as dramatically overvalue direct
evidence.”).
62 See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 910 F.3d 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2018)
(holding plaintiffs must produce “evidence that would allow a trier of fact to nudge the ball over
the 50-yard line and rationally to say that the existence of an agreement is more likely than not”);
In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasizing
that, in making the determination, the court should consider the “record as a whole and in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in its favor”).
63 When plaintiffs are alleging an “implausible” conspiracy—one to lower prices with small
hope of recoupment, for example—they must produce correspondingly more persuasive evi-
dence to raise a jury issue of agreement. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 899 F.3d
87, 102 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that, because alleged agreement was irrational, “[t]he kind of
broad inferences Anderson urges upon us and that would be permitted if the conspiracy were
economically sensible are not appropriate here”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019); In re
Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]here a plaintiff’s theory of
recovery is implausible, it takes strong direct or circumstantial evidence to satisfy Matsushita’s
‘tends to exclude’ standard.”).
64 The Supreme Court has emphasized these limitations in its summary judgment jurispru-
dence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). See
also id. at 249 (“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
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there will be no issue of their reasonableness.65 Matsushita “authorize[d] an
inquiry on summary judgment into the ‘implausibility’ of inferences from cir-
cumstantial evidence, particularly in antitrust conspiracy cases, not an inquiry
into the credibility of direct evidence.”66 Moreover, “arguments concerning
the weight to be given [to] . . . testimony are not appropriate at the summary
judgment stage, at which the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs.”67 One court, for example, denied summary judgment
because “a jury considering [the direct evidence] could believe it and reasona-
bly conclude that agreements not to compete did exist. . . . The possibility that
a jury might not believe the direct evidence does not, in itself, mean that the
jury should not consider it.”68 After a trial on remand, the jury found for the
defendant, evidently not believing the plaintiff’s evidence—a result fully con-
sistent with its role in evaluating credibility.69
issue for trial.”). The Court recently reminded courts of appeals of this constraint on their discre-
tion. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014) (“The witnesses on both sides come to this case
with their own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases. . . . By weighing the evi-
dence and reaching factual inferences contrary to [the plaintiff’s] competent evidence, the court
below neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage,
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.”); id. at 658 (“By failing
to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the court improperly
‘weigh[ed] the evidence’ and resolved disputed issues in favor of the moving party.”) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
65 Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating that because “no inferences are required from direct evidence to establish a fact
. . . a court need not be concerned about the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from
such evidence”).
66 McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988). See also T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.
Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1987):
[T]he inquiry [on a motion for summary judgment] focuses on whether the nonmoving
party has come forward with sufficiently “specific” facts from which to draw reasona-
ble inferences about other material facts that are necessary elements of the nonmoving
party’s claim. Were we to construe the Court’s statements as requiring a court to ask
whether a jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party viewing all of the evi-
dence—both that presented by the nonmoving party and that presented by the moving
party—such a construction would contradict the clear instruction that a court may not
weigh the evidence or assess its credibility.
Id. at 631 n.3.
67 In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (D. Kan. 2012).
68 Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).
69 See Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 386 F. App’x 214, 223 (3d Cir.
2010) (distinguishing “the duty of a district court to deny a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient for
presentation to a jury to determine its credibility and weight” from the jury’s duty to determine
“whether the plaintiff’s direct evidence of an unlawful agreement has been proved . . . by a
preponderance of the evidence”).
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II. THE CLASSIFICATION AND SUFFICIENCY OF DIRECT
EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT
In the last Part, I explained why direct evidence is important on motions
testing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to raise a jury issue. Direct
evidence raises straightforward inferences of a fact, so challenges to the evi-
dence are usually limited to questions of credibility, which are always for the
jury. In this section, I consider how courts classify evidence and allegations as
direct and how they evaluate its sufficiency.
A. SUFFICIENCY OF DIRECT EVIDENCE ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Some courts have said that producing direct evidence of agreement by itself
satisfies the plaintiff’s burden on a motion for summary judgment and takes
the case entirely out of the Matsushita framework.70 One court has even de-
fined direct evidence in terms of legal sufficiency: “Direct evidence [of agree-
ment] is that which can defeat a request for summary judgment if ‘taken as
true,’ whereas circumstantial evidence can defeat a summary judgment mo-
tion only if inferences are drawn in the nonmovant’s favor.”71 This definition
combines the standard definition of direct evidence (it requires no inferences
to prove a fact at issue) with the special role of direct evidence in evaluating
the legal sufficiency (that the court must assume its truth). Other courts re-
quire a showing of a tendency to exclude independent action, “whether it be
by circumstantial or direct evidence.”72 Based on passages like these, some
70 Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Under our jurisprudence, the
Matsushita standard only applies when the plaintiff has failed to put forth direct evidence of
conspiracy.”). Most of these statements are dicta because the courts go on to find no direct
evidence. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (11th
Cir. 2003) (“In the unusual case where the plaintiff is able to muster direct evidence of price
fixing, summary judgment is categorically inappropriate.”) (dicta); InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg,
L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2003) (referring to a “direct evidence exception”) (dicta). Other
cases use similar language in dicta. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
873 F.3d 185, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (dicta); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801
F.3d 383, 397 n.9 (3d Cir. 2015) (dicta); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 n.7
(3d Cir. 2004) (dicta); Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1234 (dicta). The Third Circuit has adopted a
similar rule on motions to dismiss. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“[C]onsistent with summary judgment analysis, plus factors need be pled only when
a plaintiff’s claims of conspiracy rest on parallel conduct. Allegations of direct evidence of an
agreement, if sufficiently detailed, are independently adequate.”).
71 Toscano v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, 258 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2001).
72 Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted). See also id. at 424 (“Although the presentation of direct evidence of an unlawful con-
spiracy will likely preclude a lawful explanation, it does not follow that the possibility of inde-
pendent action need not be excluded when direct evidence is provided.”).
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have reasonably concluded that there is a circuit split over the applicability of
Matsushita to direct evidence.73
But not all direct evidence is the same. Direct evidence represents the com-
munications among rivals necessary to form the alleged agreement, but this
standard is a matter of degree—how few inferences from the evidence are
necessary to prove the agreement.74 The number of inferences depends on two
characteristics of the evidence. First, it depends on the relative clarity or ambi-
guity of the evidence. Evidence differs, for example, for example, in how
fully it represents the contents of a communication. Second—and equally im-
portant—classification depends on the relative completeness with which the
evidence represents the full range of facts in issue on the questions of agree-
ment. Evidence is only direct evidence of what it represents. Evidence may
clearly represent a communication, but not the full temporal and spatial scope
or all the participants in the alleged agreement. In that case, as I explain more
fully in this section, it may be direct evidence of parts of the alleged agree-
ment, but only circumstantial evidence of others.
Where the court places the evidence on these two continuums will deter-
mine whether it classifies it as direct evidence of the full agreement or of
relevant facts that fall short of the full agreement. That decision, in turn, will
influence whether the evidence is sufficient by itself or only in combination
with other circumstantial evidence.  The two decisions interact: the court can
choose to classify the evidence in different ways, or even in alternative ways,
depending upon its relationship to other circumstantial evidence. And there is
choice involved, so not every court will see the same pattern of evidence in
the same way.
Most courts find that unambiguous evidence of the terms of the alleged
agreement itself, or unambiguous evidence of communication that addresses
all aspects of an alleged agreement, satisfies the standard of sufficiency. In
Wellbutrin, for example, the court found that a “signed agreement is direct
evidence of a conspiracy” and “the existence of the Wellbutrin Settlement—
73 See, e.g., PROOF OF CONSPIRACY, supra note 77, at 187–88 (suggesting that the Third, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that Matsushita does not apply where the plaintiff has pro-
duced direct evidence, but Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold otherwise).
74 In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (“All evidence, including
direct evidence, can sometimes require a factfinder to draw inferences to reach a particular con-
clusion, though ‘[p]erhaps on average circumstantial evidence requires a longer chain of infer-
ences.’”) (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Posner, J.)). The court found that “the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs and with proper regard for the Matsushita standards, could support a rea-
sonable inference of illegal collusive behavior.” Id. The court added that “Whether or not this
testimony—a co-conspirator’s acknowledgment that he understood his numerous communica-
tions . . . to reflect a price-fixing agreement—admits any ambiguity . . . the testimony is surely
strong evidence of a collusive scheme . . . .” Id.
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an agreement—is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that GSK
participated in the alleged conspiracy,” without further analysis under Matsu-
shita.75 Written instruments, of course, are not themselves the agreement at
issue; they are direct evidence of the agreement—perhaps the best kind.
Courts might require all direct evidence to spell out the full scope and terms
of the agreement. Any evidence or pattern of evidence that fell short of that
degree of clarity and thoroughness would then be relegated to the circumstan-
tial category. Many courts, however, use the category of direct evidence in a
more flexible and qualified sense for these other patterns. This more flexible
approach still assumes an unmet ideal of explicit evidence of the full agree-
ment but recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of less-than-ideal evidence.
Courts sometimes accept relatively ambiguous evidence of communications
as direct. One example is Toledo Mack, quoted earlier.76 There, the direct
evidence was borderline: testimony describing statements of dealers that they
“did not compete on price” and other testimony dealers had a “gentlemen’s
agreement” or “unwritten understandings”77 not to compete in one other’s ter-
ritories. These kinds of statements, which do not describe direct communica-
tions or the terms of the agreement, are arguably consistent with lawful tacit
collusion. Nevertheless, the court found the evidence was direct and alone
sufficient to raise a jury issue, even though “Toledo’s inability to present the
details of any agreement among dealers [might] leave a jury unpersuaded that
such agreements did in fact exist.”78
Calling these conclusory statements direct evidence of agreement is a
stretch. Another court characterized similar testimony referring to an “unwrit-
ten understanding” as “weak direct evidence” that should be evaluated along
with still more ambiguous evidence, but still held it sufficient.79 As I show in
Part IV, other courts characterize similar evidence as noneconomic circum-
stantial evidence of “traditional conspiracy,” which can be the decisive plus
factor necessary to avoid summary judgment. Still more ambiguous evidence
75 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133 F. Supp. 3d 734, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (dicta), aff’d
on other grounds, 868 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2017). The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants on grounds of, for example, lack of anticompetitive effect, but considered the
issue of agreement “in an effort to be complete.” Id. at 769 n.51.
76 Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
77 Id. at 220.
78 Id.
79 See Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1257,
1301, 1315 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding testimony that “there was an unwritten understanding that
[managed care providers] would not be extending managed care contracts to specialty hospitals”
like the plaintiff, was only “weak direct evidence” and that still less specific statements referring
to agreements were circumstantial evidence, but that, considered together, the evidence was suf-
ficient to avoid summary judgment).
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of communications—those equally likely to have a purely benign interpreta-
tion—are likely to be found insufficient to avoid summary judgment.80
Clear but less complete evidence might be direct evidence of some part of
the agreement at issue, but only circumstantial evidence of the completed
agreement. When courts find that the evidence falls short of the proof of a
completed agreement, they may still say that there is direct evidence of a
component fact, such as communications,81 an invitation to collude,82 or one
side of an allegedly conspiratorial phone call.83 In cases like these, the evi-
dence may be direct, in the sense that it establishes a fact through a document
or the direct observation of the witness, but it is, at most, circumstantial evi-
dence of the alleged agreement. In other instances, as I say, courts may find
there is direct evidence of an agreement, but not the full scope of the agree-
ment the plaintiff alleges. For example, evidence of private communications
among three defendants might be direct evidence of their participation in the
agreement, but not direct evidence of a fourth defendant’s participation.84
A few courts have used the term “weak direct evidence” or similar lan-
guage to characterize direct evidence of part of the alleged agreement.85 In
80 See, e.g., Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc., 490 F. App’x 492, 498 & 500
(3d Cir. 2012) (finding testimony of a witness that he did “not recall the exact words . . . [of] the
alleged illicit conversation” but had “a general sense that there was something wrong about” it
was too vague to be either direct or circumstantial evidence of conspiracy).
81 See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding “direct
evidence of communications” was circumstantial evidence supporting the FTC’s inference of
horizontal agreement among toy companies (at the urging of Toys “R” Us) to boycott warehouse
clubs); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding plaintiffs’
“direct evidence evince[d] only an exchange of information among the defendants”).
82 See, e.g., U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co., No. 04-5182, 2009 WL 89692, at
*10 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding a note that “memorialize[d] an offer made by Griffin to limit its
suppliers in return for Scotts’ limitation of distributors” was not direct, because to “stand as
proof of conspiracy, a jury would need to infer that this offer was accepted”).
83 Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Group Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00438-LDD, 2010 WL
11470613, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2010) (finding allegations that a witness overheard one side of a
conversation about making a major price increase were “direct evidence only of what [the wit-
ness] now believes [that side] said in 2001”).
84 A defendant is liable only if sufficient evidence links it to the conspiracy. See, e.g., In re
Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that, despite guilty pleas by four
of its rivals, “we can find nothing in the record that establishes, without requiring any inferences,
that Cargill participated in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy”). In Citric Acid, the district
court had found direct evidence that Cargill did not participate. In re Citric Acid Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (finding “most persuasive” the testimony of a conspirator “that
no one from Cargill attended any of the meetings at which the conspirators allocated market
share”), aff’d, 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts also found direct evidence of agreement
among fewer than all the named defendants in Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 472
(3d Cir. 1998) and In re Citric Acid, 996 F. Supp. at 956.
85 See, e.g., JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding circumstantial evidence was sufficient, but adding the plaintiff had “some direct evi-
dence as well [that] strikes us as equivocal, and we have not thought it necessary to discuss it;
but we do not mean to suggest that it should not be admitted at the trial”).
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Champagne Metals, for example, the court found evidence that an existing
distributor warned a supplier its dealings with the plaintiff were “not in the
best interest of the industry, and would cause other distributors in that area of
the country to source their metals from other mill sources”86 was “explicit,”
but was nevertheless only “weak direct evidence” of an agreement among
distributors, because, among other shortcomings, it did not name other distrib-
utors that were part of the agreement.87 Consequently “additional circumstan-
tial evidence [was] required to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”88
The same testimony could as easily, and with the same result, have been
treated as noneconomic circumstantial evidence of the agreement.
A court, especially one anticipating review, may also evaluate the evidence
on alternative grounds: either as direct if viewed separately, or as circumstan-
tial if viewed as part of a complex pattern. In Urethane,89 for example, a class
of urethane buyers alleged that the manufacturers, including Dow, the only
non-settling defendant, had conspired to fix prices. On a motion for summary
judgment, the “most substantial direct evidence of an agreement to fix
prices”90 was the testimony of a Dow executive that she had attended meet-
ings at which her superior said repeatedly that “he had met with [named com-
petitors] and reached agreements to set prices and make price increases
stick.”91 She also testified another Dow executive told her a rival was “un-
happy because Dow was not charging the full amount of a recent price in-
crease with a particular customer,” and warned her that, if she “told anyone
about their conversation, he would deny it and call her a liar.”92 And she got a
call from a competitor who said, “I just want to let you know we’re being
good.”93 Dow tried to refute the testimony with denials by the named execu-
86 Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1083 (10th Cir. 2006).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1884. After remand, the district court found that the evidence was “not overwhelm-
ing,” but viewed “cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” it established
“the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Established Distributors entered into a
conspiracy.” Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., No. CIV-02-0528-HE, 2007 WL
4115994, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2007). Similarly, in Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156
F.3d 452, 468 (3d Cir. 1998), the court found that plaintiff’s testimony that a rival claimed to
have an agreement with another rival and threatened to cut off the plaintiff’s supplies was direct
evidence. Nevertheless, the court found plaintiff’s evidence was “not enough by itself to satisfy
[the plaintiff’s] burden in opposing summary judgment” in favor of all the defendants, particu-
larly a primary supplier. Id. at 469. It denied summary judgment only after a detailed analysis of
all the circumstantial evidence. Id. at 472 (“Looking at all of the evidence Rossi has assembled
. . . we conclude that he has satisfied his burden in opposing summary judgment on the concerted
action prong.”).
89 In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (D. Kan. 2012).
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tives, but the court responded that “[s]uch arguments concerning the weight to
be given this testimony . . . are not appropriate at the summary judgment
stage, at which the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs.”94
The court recognized that “some of this testimony might be characterized
as circumstantial instead of direct evidence—the second and third incidents”
described above, but “the remainder of this testimony does constitute direct
evidence of an agreement, in the form of admissions by persons with knowl-
edge of the agreement. No additional inference is necessary to get to the exis-
tence of an agreement.”95 Despite this last finding, the district court covered
all the bases by adding that “even if none of this evidence constituted strong
direct evidence that could defeat summary judgment by itself, each piece of
evidence supports the other, such that a reasonable jury could find that an
agreement existed from this testimony taken together.”96 Other circumstantial
evidence, both references to more ambiguous communications and economic
plus factors, also corroborated the direct evidence.97
B. SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATIONS OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence also affects the
evaluation of the plausibility of allegations under Twombly’s pleading stan-
dard. The courts recognize the differences between the two contexts: at the
pleading stage, plaintiffs have not ordinarily had access to discovery, but may
still allege the existence of evidence they have already or hope to find during
discovery,98 within the bounds of Rule 11.99 If plaintiffs do allege direct (or
94 Id. at 1154.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1155–56. Dow proposed a number of legitimate justifications for its actions, but the
court refused to consider them because of the existence of some direct evidence. Id. at 1157.
98 See, e.g., Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t., 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Although
the Twombly court acknowledged that for purposes of summary judgment a plaintiff must present
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action . . . it specifically held that, to
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need only enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that an agreement was made.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); In re Broiler Chicken
Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 804 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Any direct evidence of the agree-
ment will only be uncovered through discovery. Allegations that each defendant participated in
the parallel conduct, participated in the meetings that provided the opportunity to collude, partici-
pated in [a statistical exchange program], and participated in variable contracts or exports, are
sufficient to allege participation in the agreement.”). Cf. In re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litig.,
No. C-07-5944-SC, 2013 WL 5425183, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (applying more strin-
gent pleading standards after plaintiff in an MDL had access to discovery in related litigation).
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (providing that presenting a complaint represents to the court that
“the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”).
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very probative circumstantial) evidence agreement, courts assume the alleged
facts to be true and deny the motion to dismiss.100 Discovery, however, may
well fail to locate testimony or documentary evidence to back up the allega-
tions, so plaintiffs often survive a motion to dismiss only to lose on summary
judgment.101
Even recognizing the differences in context, courts describe the pleading
requirements using many of the same terms that courts use on motions for
summary judgment. Courts, for example, interpret Twombly to require anti-
trust plaintiffs to allege a version of the plus factors necessary to avoid sum-
mary judgment.102 They also use language drawn from the summary judgment
context, like the “no inferences” definition of direct evidence, to evaluate alle-
gations of direct evidence on a motion to dismiss.103 In Twombly, the Court
adapted Matsushita’s inferential standards to motions to dismiss a complaint’s
allegations of agreement.104 In doing so, it distinguished complaints that allege
100 See, e.g., Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (“If a
complaint includes non-conclusory allegations of direct evidence of an agreement, a court need
go no further on the question whether an agreement has been adequately pled.”); Rochester Drug
Co-op., Inc. v. Biogen Idec U.S., 130 F. Supp. 3d 764, 769 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[U]nder
Twombly, while a Sherman Act § 1 complaint premised on direct evidence of an agreement
requires ‘time, place, or person’ allegations regarding the claimed illegal agreement, complaints
premised on circumstantial evidence, which are the lion’s share of the pleadings in the antitrust
arena, do not require such factual matter.”).
101 Compare Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 187 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“The [complaint] alleges actual agreement; it alleges not just that all of the defendants ceased, in
virtual lock-step, to deal with [a rival], but alleges that on various dates within the preceding
two-week period defendants . . . had met or communicated with their competitors and others and
made statements that may plausibly be interpreted as evincing their agreement to attempt to
eliminate [rivals] . . . and to divide [the] market”), with Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media,
Inc., 899 F.3d 87, 113 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Although some of the evidence discussed above is sug-
gestive of an agreement . . . the evidence [as a whole] does not sufficiently ‘tend to exclude’ the
possibility that defendants acted permissibly.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019).
102 See, e.g., Quality Auto Painting Ctr. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2019) (en banc) (applying the “tends to exclude” standard on a motion to dismiss); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 323 n.22 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Twombly “neces-
sarily rejected the proposition that plaintiffs may plead conspiracy on the basis of mere parallel-
ism—and thus necessarily required the pleading of plus factors”). A similar standard applied in
some circuits even before Twombly. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253–54
(2d Cir. 1987) (“[The] plaintiff must show the existence of additional circumstances, often re-
ferred to as ‘plus’ factors, which, when viewed in conjunction with the parallel acts, can serve to
allow a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy.”).
103 See, e.g., In re N.J. Tax Sales Certificates Antitrust Litig., No. 12-1893 (MAS) (TJB), 2014
WL 5512661, at *4 n.7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014) (“Although [the] definition of direct evidence of
conspiracy comes from a case discussing the standard for proving a conspiracy on summary
judgment . . . the standard has been applied in cases involving a motion to dismiss.”) (citing In re
Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)).
104 Courts must first identify plaintiff’s factual allegations and then determine the plausibility
of inferences of collusion from the alleged facts, assumed to be true, in much the same way they
must determine the sufficiency of inferences of collusion from circumstantial evidence under
Matsushita. See TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 844 F. Supp. 2d 571, 584 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (“We find that Twombly requires a level of factual detail that makes it more likely that the
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only parallel conduct from those that include “independent allegation[s] of
actual agreement among” defendants.105 Some lower courts have interpreted
this language to mean “[a]llegations of direct evidence of an agreement, if
sufficiently detailed, are independently adequate.”106 For example, one court
recently rejected a defendant’s argument that witnesses’ “alleged confessions
[were] ‘nonsensical’” because the court could not “ignore well-pleaded alle-
gations of fact (that the executives admitted the agreement), and then credit an
inference in Defendants’ favor.”107
And here too, courts usually find plaintiffs have failed to allege direct evi-
dence.108 For example, a “conclusory” allegation that unnamed employees of
rivals “reached an agreement” on a particular date to raise prices on two prod-
ucts was “insufficiently detailed to constitute direct evidence suggesting that
an agreement was made.”109 Nevertheless, courts have found direct evidence
in sufficiently specific allegations of phone calls or emails,110 meetings,111 or
Defendants’ conduct was the result of an unlawful agreement rather than some other independent
and lawful explanation and that such requirement is not a ‘probability’ requirement.”). But see
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 340 (2013) (“I
always thought ‘more likely’ meant a fifty-one percent likelihood or more. How is that not a
probability requirement, which is precisely what Twombly and Iqbal said is not required to estab-
lish a complaint’s plausibility?”).
105 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
106 Insurance Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 323. The court added that, “after Twombly, if a plaintiff
expects to rely exclusively on direct evidence of conspiracy, its complaint must plead ‘enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ this direct evidence.” Id. at 324.
See also Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2013)
(Twombly “elicited considerable confusion” about pleading agreement “in the absence of direct
evidence.”); Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (“If a com-
plaint includes non-conclusory allegations of direct evidence of an agreement, a court need go no
further on the question whether an agreement has been adequately pled.”).
107 In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
108 See, e.g., Tichy v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 376 F. Supp. 3d 821, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (agreeing
with defendant’s argument that the complaint did not plead direct evidence because “[t]here are
not even factual allegations of any communications”); In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Anti-
trust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 896–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (stating that plaintiff could plead
direct evidence by alleging a “recorded phone call or email in which competitors agreed to fix
prices,” but finding that allegations of text messages among defendants were too ambiguous to
constitute direct evidence).
109 In re Mylan N.V. Secs. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 3d 198, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
110 See, e.g., In re Iowa Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 340
F. Supp. 3d 285, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that allegation that one executive stated “on a
recorded . . . conference call” that he and a rival executive had “agreed that Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs needed to ‘get a hold of this thing’” by excluding the rival “qualified as direct”).
111 See, e.g., Watson Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458
(6th Cir. 2011) (finding sufficient allegations that (1) a rival carpet dealer met with a carpet
supplier’s managers to form a plan to exclude the plaintiff by denying needed supplies, and (2)
that actual refusals to sell in three later years “stemmed from” the earlier agreement); Lease Am.
Org. Inc. v. Rowe Int’l Corp., No. 13-40015-TSH, 2014 WL 1330928, at *2 (D. Mass. March 31,
2014) (finding allegations that defendant association “convened a meeting” at which “it was
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admissions,112 if the alleged communications include the necessary promises
or statements of intent. Although some allegations are extraordinarily spe-
cific,113 less specific allegations can be sufficient before any discovery.114 At
least one court has applied the category of “weak direct evidence” to charac-
terize allegations on a motion to dismiss.115 I consider some of these cases in
the next Part.
III. FORMS OF DIRECT EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT
In this article I have been arguing that courts call evidence direct if it repre-
sents the communications that formed the alleged agreement relatively com-
pletely and unambiguously. Direct evidence almost always satisfies
Matsushita and allegations of it almost always satisfy Twombly, either by
themselves or with other evidence. Evidence that is somewhat less clear or
that represents parts or elements of the alleged agreement might be classified
as direct in a qualified sense. In this Part, I consider how courts have applied
this concept of direct evidence to the forms of evidence that commonly appear
decided to boycott [another defendant] if it continued to allow [plaintiff] to sell direct,” and that
the association then made the planned threat, “more than made out a plausible claim of direct
evidence of an illegal agreement”).
112 See, e.g., In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 510, 535–36 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (finding that an executive’s admission that “[W]e’ve entered into an agreement” with
named rivals and “we’re working collaboratively to remove all hostile integrators from our DMS
system” was direct evidence). For a broader interpretation of direct evidence allegations, see B &
R Supermarket, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., No. C 16-01150 WHA, 2016 WL 5725010, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2016) (holding that an allegation that a credit card vice president said that “the card
brands are not going to delay the liability shift date” was direct evidence of a conspiracy (to shift
liability to merchants if they failed to adopt chip technology), because she “could not speak so
confidently on behalf of all networks save and except for her knowledge of collusion, for true
competition would have driven one or more networks to break ranks and offer more competitive
terms”).
113 See, e.g., In re N.J. Tax Certificates Antitrust Litig., No. 12-1893 (MAS) (TJB), 2014 WL
5512661, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014) (finding the plaintiffs alleged “direct evidence of conspir-
acy regarding the individual auctions, combined with allegations of statewide collusion” by
“provid[ing] the date and location of each alleged instance of collusion [in nearly 50 municipal
auctions], as well as the identities of the conspirators” and their roles “in advancing the
conspiracy”).
114 See, e.g., Markson v. CRST Int’l, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-01261-VAP-SPx, 2019 WL 6354400, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019) (“Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs [having pleaded direct evi-
dence of a no-poaching conspiracy] must specifically allege which persons, on behalf of Defend-
ants, consummated the conspiracy and exactly when they did so goes beyond the pleading
requirement—otherwise, those subjected to a conspiracy would almost never be able to survive a
motion to dismiss because, by definition, they were not privy to such transactions and discovery
would be required to reveal any more specific evidence.”).
115 Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1074–75 (D. Colo. 2016) (holding
that an allegation that a defendant’s representative “admitted that there was an understanding
between all of the Sponsors to pay standard au pairs the same amount” equal to the government-
set minimum, among other statements, was “‘weak’ direct evidence” because it did not identify
the speaker; additional allegations of circumstantial evidence satisfied Twombly).
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in Section 1 litigation.116 In Part IV, I will argue that courts’ understanding of
direct evidence in cases like these also guides the evaluation of circumstantial
evidence in analogous contexts.
A. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF AGREEMENT
The Eleventh Circuit recently said that “a contract can serve as the basis for
a Section 1 claim only if it embodies an agreement to unlawfully restrain
trade.”117 Although the court was not talking about direct evidence, it can be
understood in those terms: any written contract is evidence of an agreement,
but it is only direct evidence of Section 1 agreement if it fully represents the
agreement alleged in the complaint to be unlawful. In Androgel, for example,
the court wrote:
In this case, the settlement agreements specifically address the conduct the
Plaintiffs argue is unlawful. The parties negotiated and agreed that in ex-
change for dropping the patent litigation, providing some services, and de-
laying generic introduction until 2015, the Generics would receive
compensation. Whether that common objective—dropping the patent litiga-
tion in exchange for compensation—was an illegal restraint of trade is a
separate question. But if it was, then the settlements are clear, direct evi-
dence of an agreement to unlawfully restrain trade. Not only is there enough
evidence for a jury to find that there was an agreement, it is doubtful that a
reasonable jury could find otherwise.118
Notice that the court emphasized that the settlement is the product of negotia-
tion and, on its face, reflects their express agreement.
Modern pay-for-delay patent settlements are not the only agreements that
can fit this description. In the early years of antitrust, rivals were known to
spell out the details of cartel agreements in written contracts. In United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., for example, the government alleged six pipe
producers formed a bid rigging and market allocation agreement in violation
of Section 1.119 The court considered a range of economic and documentary
evidence, including passages from the minutes of the producers’ association,
to illustrate the practical operation of the arrangement, both as an “auction
pool” and as a system of “reserved” cities designating members of the associ-
ation as winning bidders. But Judge Taft held that the producers’ written
“contract of association,” which spelled out the terms of the agreement, was
“on its face an extensive scheme to control the whole commerce among 36
116 See also PROOF OF CONSPIRACY, supra note 77, at 63–65 (surveying “witness testimony,”
“documents showing an agreement,” “guilty pleas,” and “admissions by a defendant”).
117 Procaps S.A. v. Patheon, Inc., 845 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2016).
118 In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1:09-MD-2084-TWT, 2018 WL 2984873, at *8
(N.D. Ga. June 14, 2018).
119 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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states in cast-iron pipe, and that the defendants were fully aware of the fact
whether they appreciated the application to it of the anti-trust law or not.”120
In more recent Supreme Court decisions, like Professional Engineers,121
Maricopa,122 and NCAA,123 formal arrangements satisfied the agreement ele-
ment so clearly that defendants did not contest the existence of agreement but
instead argued it was lawful under some version of the rule of reason—the
“separate issue” the court mentioned in Androgel. Similarly, in Palmer v.
BRG of Georgia, Inc.,124 a national bar review course provider signed a writ-
ten agreement with BRG, a Georgia bar review provider, under which the
parties agreed the national provider “would not compete with BRG in Georgia
and that BRG would not compete with [the national provider] outside of
Georgia.”125 The Supreme Court found the agreement per se illegal in an un-
signed, per curiam opinion. As the dissenting judge in the court of appeals
wrote, the “explicit written agreement between two competitors allocating
markets and interfering with independent price setting” was “direct evidence”
of the illegal agreement.126
The category of written direct evidence of agreement may include multiple
agreements with a common objective. In one case, a series of written resolu-
tions in which rivals adopted unified positions in rate negotiations with a gov-
ernment agency was “direct evidence of an express agreement between
defendant hospitals” that justified summary judgment for the plaintiff on the
issue of agreement.127 Similarly, a resolution of local dental associations rec-
ommending that their members not participate in Blue Shield, followed by
“mass withdrawals of participation,” amounted to “direct, frequent, public,
on-the-record evidence of improper concerted action.”128
120 Id. at 301; see also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 292–97
(1897) (quoting the text of a written cartel agreement).
121 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684 (1978) (describing engi-
neers’ admitted agreement “to abide by canons of ethics prohibiting the submission of competi-
tive bids”).
122 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 335 (1982) (describing “agreements
among competing physicians setting, by majority vote, [their] maximum fees”).
123 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 91–92
(1984) (describing the NCAA’s Television Plan, approved by vote of its members, that limited
the number of college football games broadcast).
124 498 U.S. 46 (1990), rev’g 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1989).
125 Id. at 47.
126 874 F.2d at 1431 (Clark, J., dissenting).
127 United States v. N. Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D. N.D. 1986).
128 Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n of Pa., 815 F.2d 270, 273–74 (3d Cir. 1987). See also
Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. CIV. 11-1290 RMB KMW,
2012 WL 1390249, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2012) (finding “direct evidence. . . Defendants’ con-
duct was coordinated with its alleged coconspirators, not independent,” including “a written
agreement” and a “written e-mail between all the parties to the alleged conspiracy” that were
alone sufficient to show defendants’ “participation in the alleged conspiracy”).
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Other written direct evidence may be hot documents in corporate files
clearly representing the operation of an agreement with a rival. One court
found that an internal memorandum describing a meeting of an auto dealers’
association was direct evidence of a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from
receiving a franchise.129 More recently, a court found that “statements and
emails . . . indicating that the casinos had entered into a ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ment’ to not deal with” plaintiff’s web site and that one casino “had to termi-
nate its relationship with [the site] as a result of the casinos’ agreement at the
May 30, 2001 meeting” were “if credited, direct evidence” of the alleged
boycott.130
B. VIDEO OR VOICE RECORDINGS AND CONVERSATIONS
BY TEXT OR SOCIAL MEDIA
In a frequently cited passage, the Second Circuit offered as a paradigm of
direct evidence of agreement “a recorded phone call in which two competitors
agreed to fix prices at a certain level.”131 Precedents characterizing video or
voice recordings as direct evidence are more common in drug conspiracies,132
but recordings have played an important and comparable role in Section 1
cases as well.133 High-quality recordings of conversations in which identifi-
129 Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc., 826 F.2d 1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1987).
130 Tunica Web Adver. v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass’n, 496 F.3d 403, 410–11 (5th Cir.
2007). The court remanded for the district court to determine whether the emails were admissible
and whether the admissible evidence sufficiently suggested agreement. Id. at 411. See also W.
Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2010) (allegations of a letter
between the defendants and the CEO’s admission of concerted action were direct evidence).
Written evidence of communications, of course, may not be direct or even suggestive of agree-
ment. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
plaintiffs’ “direct evidence evince[d] only an exchange of information among the defendants”);
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[H]ere the
emails actually reveal disagreement among the Appellees.”).
131 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2013).
132 Video evidence is regularly used in prosecutions of drug conspiracies. See, e.g., United
States v. Becerra, 942 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1991) (table), opinion at No. 89-10424, 1991 WL
162175, at *2 (9th Cir. June 11, 1991) (finding videotape of meeting of the defendant discussing
drug transactions with a government informant was direct evidence of the conspiracy); United
States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding videotape was direct evidence of
defendant’s role in a drug conspiracy).
133 See, e.g., Citigroup, 709 F.3d at 136 (holding plaintiffs may rely on “direct evidence that
the defendants entered into an agreement,” exemplified by “a recorded phone call in which two
competitors agreed to fix prices”); Obron Atl. Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 864–65 (6th Cir.
1993) (permitting use in judicial proceedings of tape recordings of price-fixing conversations
made by an Obron executive while under government supervision). Compare In re Iowa Pub.
Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 285, 318
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018) (characterizing as direct the complaint’s allegation of “a recorded
conference call” in which an executive admitted he had “agreed that [their firms] needed to ‘get a
hold of this thing’” by excluding a rival), with In re Mylan N.V. Secs. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 3d
198, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding allegation of “a single April 23, 2014 phone call” that did
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able rivals exchange promises to act in concert can result in guilty pleas.134
For example, in the Marine Hose investigation, a leniency applicant “provided
the location” of a planned meeting, “so the [Antitrust] Division could place a
video camera in the room and record the meeting [at which a] paid organizer
of the cartel made a presentation of how successful the cartel had been for the
members.”135 The episode led to immediate arrests and guilty pleas of most
participants soon afterward. If it were litigated, courts would almost certainly
have found the tapes were direct evidence of agreement among most of those
in attendance. .
But not all those in attendance. As Richard Greenstein writes, even though
“a videotape is the epitome of direct evidence,” it still can’t “record intentions
directly.”136 In Marine Hose itself, a jury acquitted a defendant visible in one
of the tapes after it heard evidence that he “attended one meeting of the con-
spiracy (in the eight years the conspiracy was in place), that he did not really
understand what the meeting was about until he was there, and that he did not
actively engage in the meeting.”137
Analogously, text message, chat room, social media, or email conversations
that rivals use to coordinate an agreement can also be direct evidence, if the
technologies record the communications used to form the agreement.138 For
“not identify which employees were involved, where the call took place, or the contours of the
alleged agreements” was not direct).
134 See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Whitacre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 819, 827 (C.D. Ill. 1999)
(“[B]ased in part on the tape recordings made by Whitacre, ADM pleaded guilty to price-fixing
and paid a fine of $100 million.”) (citing United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1055–56 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000)). Cf. Can Erutku & Vincent A.
Hildebrand, Conspiracy at the Pump, 53 J.L. & ECON. 223, 223–24 (2010) (“The analysis of the
intercepted communications [obtained by court-authorized wiretaps in Canada, and leading to
fines and guilty pleas] revealed the presence of cartel ringmasters, many of them present in more
than one of the targeted markets, who coordinated a specific price increase for most of the local
retail gasoline outlets at a particular time.”).
135 Donald C. Klawiter, Antitrust Criminal Sanctions: The Evolution of Executive Punishment,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2012, at 90, 98. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Three United Kingdom Nationals Plead Guilty to Participating in Bid Rigging Conspiracy in the
Marine Hose Industry (Dec. 12, 2007), www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_at_
995.html.
136 Greenstein, supra note 43, at 1820.
137 Mark Rosman & Jeff VanHooreweghe, What Goes Up, Doesn’t Come Down: The Absence
of the Mitigating-Role Adjustment in Antitrust Sentencing, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 6 n.26 (Aug.
2012), www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/rosman-august-12.pdf. For the minute entry of acquittal, see
United States v. Scaglia, No. 0:07-cr-60220-DTKH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2007) (ECF 226).
138 Any transcript of conversations that formed the alleged agreement would fit this category.
Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 310, 319 (6th Cir. 2014), for example, found that
rivals’ transcribed statements at a hearing were too ambiguous to be direct (or circumstantial)
evidence of a conspiracy to fix real estate commissions. But a verbatim transcription of clearer
descriptions would qualify. See, e.g., Kjessler v. Zaappaaz, Inc., No. 4:18-0430, 2019 WL
3017132 (S.D. Tex. 2019), in which the complaint alleged, among other evidence, that the de-
fendants communicated by texts, Facebook messages, WhatsApp groups, and face-to-face meet-
2020] DIRECT EVIDENCE OF A SHERMAN ACT AGREEMENT 375
example, in the Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates litigation, the court char-
acterized the allegations that “banks used various electronic communications
platforms, particularly chat rooms and instant messaging, to share ‘market-
sensitive information with rivals’ including price-information, customer infor-
mation and their net trading positions before the setting of the Fix[ ]” as “di-
rect evidence akin to [a] ‘recorded phone’” in which rivals fix prices.139 In
much the same way as by phone, the banks allegedly agreed “‘in chat rooms
and instant messages’ to use collusive trading strategies across banks [to] . . .
manipulate[ ] the Fix to the price that they desired.”140 The complaint was
sufficient, even without “specific allegations identifying the exact date and
time of each illicit act.”141
ings to fix the prices of customized wristbands, one of several “customized promotional
products.” Id. at *5. The court denied motions to dismiss, finding the complaint included allega-
tions of direct evidence (including screen shots) of an agreement to fix prices of wristbands and
circumstantial evidence of a larger conspiracy:
The Complaint contains text and social media platform conversations where [some
defendants] admit to the cartel’s existence and implicate each other. . . . The Complaint
alleges specific, recorded meetings between [some defendants] discussing CPP pricing
and coordinating future meetings to discuss pricing. . . . It is true, within this direct
evidence, that it is unclear which CPPs are the subject of the price fixing and that only
customized wristbands are specifically mentioned. But at this stage, the Complaint
must be liberally construed in Plaintiffs’ favor . . . and it is improper “to prejudge the
scope of the conspiracy” . . . Additionally, allegations sufficient to demonstrate a price
fixing conspiracy related to certain products or practices within an industry permit an
inference of a larger conspiracy covering other products or practices.
Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted). Another recent example is In re GSE Bonds Antitrust
Litigation, 19-CV-1704 (JSR), 2019 WL 5791793, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019), which found
allegations of transcripts of chat room conversations were direct evidence of all the defendants’
participation in a conspiracy to fix prices of bonds of government-sponsored entities, and indirect
evidence of the conspiracy’s scope and duration; the court found it “implausible on its face that
[the specifically discussed] agreement would be limited to certain kinds of GSE bonds, and not
to others”). Cf. In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 3:15-md-2626-J-20JRK,
2019 WL 6463343 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2019) (finding sufficient evidence of horizontal conspir-
acy based in part on defendants’ participation in a secret Facebook group to report violations of
“unilateral price policies”).
139 In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 591 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (Forex); Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, No. 13-cv-2811 (PKC), 2017  WL 685570, *75
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2017) (finding allegations of “communications in which ‘an agreement was
made’ between defendants to submit false Euribor quotes, for the benefit of at least one defen-
dant . . . . [were] not ‘merely consistent’ with the existence of an agreement, but plausibly allege
direct evidence of ‘a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement’ to fix the Euribor.”).
140 Forex, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 591. There were allegedly chat rooms named The Cartel, The
Mafia, and The Bandit’s Club involving other traders. Id. at 592. See also In re London Silver
Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 901–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the “chat
messages included in the [complaint] are direct evidence of an anticompetitive agreement to
manipulate the silver markets” because they included “exchanges of current pricing information
by horizontal competitors . . . . [and other] paradigmatic examples of communications relevant to
a horizontal price-fixing scheme.”) (internal citations omitted).
141 Forex, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 594. But cf. In re Commodity Exch., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 217, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that quoted chats, unlike those in Forex, did not raise an inference of
conspiracy where “[t]he chat messages in the [complaint did] not evidence sharing of informa-
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C. TESTIMONY OF CO-CONSPIRATORS
Another form of direct evidence is testimony of witnesses with first-hand
knowledge of conspiratorial conversations.142 Criminal convictions and guilty
pleas in the United States often are based on testimony of immunized co-
conspirators.143 A well-known litigated example was United States v. Taub-
man, in which a jury convicted the presidents of Sotheby’s and Christie’s of
conspiring to fix sellers’ commissions on auctioned artworks.144 The govern-
ment had offered detailed testimony and memoranda of Alfred Taubman’s co-
conspirators (the immunized CEOs of the auction houses) as well as records
of numerous meetings between the presidents. Seeking a new trial, Taubman
argued that, because the trial court did not instruct the jury that there were
lawful reasons for the two men to meet, the jury may have improperly inferred
tion that would have been necessary to a fix-suppression scheme, or sharing of that information
close in time to the fixing itself”).
142 Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., No. 1:09-cv-00560-LJO-BAM, 2013
WL 595122, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“testimony from percipient witnesses that defendants agreed
at a certain meeting to fix prices or not to compete constitutes direct evidence of an agreement to
restrain trade”), aff’d, 803 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2015). Testimony detailing out-of-court admis-
sions by conspirators can also be direct evidence. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F.
Supp. 2d 1145, 1153 (D. Kan. 2012) (finding that direct evidence included testimony by Dow
executive “that on more than ten occasions, [another executive] stated that he had met with
competitors Bayer and BASF and reached agreements to set prices and make price increases
stick” was the “most substantial direct evidence of an agreement”).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Cavataio, 1 F.3d 1242 (6th Cir. 1993) (table), opinion at No. 92-
2484, 1993 WL 300327, at *1 (affirming a sentence of a defendant who pleaded guilty after an
immunized co-conspirator testified before a grand jury and “confirmed the existence of a price-
fixing scheme”); United States v. Harford, 870 F.2d 655 (table), opinion at No. 88-5139, 1989
WL 21563, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1989) (affirming convictions based on immunized “testimony
from other officers and employees of both companies about meetings and agreements as to
price,” testimony that was “supported by various documents” and “believed by the jury”); United
States v. Berger Indus., Inc., 1983 WL 725, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (“The government’s witness
. . . testified specifically and in great detail about numerous price-fixing conversations with [the
defendant] during [the relevant] period.”). Cf. United States v. Ga. Waste Sys., Inc., 731 F.2d
1580, 1581–82 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding a witness’s account of a conspirator’s description “of a
meeting at which the defendants and other co-conspirators organized and solidified their arrange-
ment” did not violate the conspirator’s right to confrontation).
Criminal antitrust enforcement strongly emphasizes direct evidence. See, e.g., D. Daniel So-
kol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1597 (2019) (“Criminal
enforcement for a generation has been limited to those cases that involve ‘naked’ collusion—the
so called ‘hard-core’ cartels where there is direct evidence of illegal activity.”); Hays Gorey, Jr.
& Henry A. Einhorn, The Use and Misuse of Economic Evidence in Horizontal Price-Fixing
Cases, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 12 n.47 (1986) (“Almost all criminal antitrust cases are based upon
direct evidence supplied by actual participants in the conspiracy.”) The government lost three
exceptional criminal cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 15–19 (describing
United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 232, modified, 437 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1970), aff’d
by an equally divided Court, 404 U.S. 548 (1972); United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1959 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,536 (D.N.J. 1959); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.
1949)).
144 United States v. Taubman, No. 01 CR 429 (GBD), 2002 WL 548733 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
2002), aff’d, 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002).
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that Taubman conspired from the mere existence of the meetings. But the
court pointed out that the CEOs of the two companies had “unequivocally
testified that they were directed by their respective chairmen to work out the
specifics of the illegal agreement,”145 providing “direct evidence that Taub-
man and [the president of Christie’s] met to discuss fixing prices, agreed to fix
prices, and ordered their respective CEOs to carry out and execute that illegal
scheme.”146 Consequently, “The jury was never asked to speculate regarding
the criminal nature of the meetings between” the defendants;147 “[h]aving
found [the CEOs] to be credible witnesses, the jury was free to accept the
direct evidence of their representation as to the unlawful purpose and content
of the meetings.”148 Immunity agreements or similar arrangements are,149 of
course, a basis for challenging credibility of witnesses at trial, but again, the
jury can decide whether to believe the testimony.150
In United States v. Therm-All, Inc., there was detailed testimony describing
telephone conversations and other communications among rivals to form and
enforce a price-fixing agreement.151 For example, according to a witness, one
rival complained to another on the telephone about “dog-eat-dog” competi-
tion, then related that he had agreed with a third rival to sell at higher, nearly
identical prices on published prices sheets; the rival on the telephone then
“immediately agreed” to the plan.152 Rivals “faxed each other price sheets, and
spoke on the phone ‘to get the pricing in line with each other . . . within a
couple of dollars of each other in each [pricing] bracket,’ trying not to use the
145 Id. at *1; see also United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Taubman’s
knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy to fix prices was not established by circumstan-
tial evidence, it was established by direct evidence—the testimony of [the CEOs] that Taubman
and Tennant had met with one another on several occasions and agreed to, inter alia, fix
prices.”).
146 Taubman, 2002 WL 548733, at *8.
147 The court added that the immunized co-conspirators’ “testimony, and notes of those meet-
ings, were the evidence in the record directly reflecting the purpose and nature of the meetings.”
Id. at *10
148 Id. at *12; see also United States v. Beaver, 515 F.3d 730, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming a
conviction for price fixing where witnesses testified that the defendant “(1) was present at the
October 2003 meeting at Nuckols’s horse barn; (2) participated in discussions on how to limit the
price of concrete; (3) did not object to the net-price-discount limit; (4) agreed to confront other
conspiracy members if he found them cheating on the agreement; and (5) agreed on additional
pricing constraints” then later “volunteered to contact [a rival] and ‘get him the message on what
we agreed on.’”); United States v. Giordano, 261 F.3d 1134, 1139 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming a
conviction where witnesses testified the defendants attended meetings and “agreed to specific
prices for various grades of scrap”).
149 The president of Sotheby’s cooperated with the prosecution based on an agreement to rec-
ommend leniency. See John J. Goldman, Ex-President of Sotheby’s Gets Probation, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2002), www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-apr-30-na-brooks30-story.html.
150 United States v. Murray, 468 F. App’x 104, 107–08 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that immunity
agreements may “inform the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and bias”).
151 United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 2004).
152 Id.
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‘exact’ same prices so that customers would not get suspicious.”153 They “po-
liced” the agreement by calling cheaters and asking for explanations of
noncompliant prices.154 The court of appeals held that, given this “direct testi-
mony,” the jury could reasonably have found that the rivals conspired, even
though there was evidence that they continued to compete with one another
for business during the conspiracy period.155
Recall that some courts say evidence that represents less than the full scope
of an agreement is “weak direct evidence.” In Champagne Metals, one of the
cases I cited earlier, the court found direct evidence that aluminum distribu-
tors had agreed to use their market power in the purchasing market to per-
suade aluminum mills not to supply the plaintiff, a “new, aggressive
entrant.”156 One of the mills’ employees testified that a representative of one
of plaintiff’s rivals told him that the relationship between the mill and the
plaintiff “was damaging to the industry” and that “we would be putting other
business with potential customers at risk” by developing it.157 The court saw
this testimony as direct evidence because, “[v]iewed in the light most
favorable to Champagne, this statement indicates an agreement among service
centers to take collective action.”158 It was “weak” because it did not identify
the participating distributors but, combined with circumstantial evidence, it
was sufficient to avoid summary judgment. After a hearing on remand, the
district court found that the direct and circumstantial evidence established the
conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence, permitting the introduction of
(otherwise) hearsay statements of co-conspirators against the defendants.159
153 Id. at 629.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 631; see also Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 468–69 (3d Cir. 1998)
(finding plaintiff’s testimony that one of his rivals threatened that [that rival and another] “would
do anything they could, stop supplies, cut the prices, whatever they had to do they were going to
do to keep me out of business” was direct evidence); Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v.
Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1301 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding that an insurer’s man-
ager’s testimony “that ‘kind of the understanding, unwritten but understood’ amongst managed
care organizations was that managed care organizations would not be extending managed care
contracts to specialty hospitals,” id. at 1288, was weak direct evidence that supported denial of
summary judgment, because it “indicates” with sufficient clarity that “an agreement among
[managed care organizations] to work collectively to exclude Heartland,” although it did not say
who the co-conspirators were).
156 Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1086 (10th Cir. 2006).
157 Id. at 1083.
158 Id. at 1084.
159 Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., No. CIV-02-0528-HE, 2008 WL 5205204, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (holding that plaintiff’s “very credible economic theory,” “direct evidence
of collusive action,” and “circumstantial evidence . . . suffice[d] to demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the existence of at least a tacit agreement among all defendants and the
mills to take collective action to exclude new entrants from the market”). See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E) (“A statement . . . is not hearsay [if it is] offered against an opposing party and . . .
was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).
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Sufficiently specific testimony can be direct evidence of the communica-
tions necessary to form a tacit agreement, but other evidence is necessary to
prove the completion of an agreement. Tacit agreement requires communica-
tion of intentions, but also actions consistent with the stated intent. Because of
the requirement of further action, direct evidence of communications alone
cannot establish a tacit agreement. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the neces-
sary communications can provide the grounding for the inference of agree-
ment based on subsequent actions. For example, one issue in the early U.S.
Steel case was the legality of so-called Gary dinners and the ensuing meetings
among most of U.S. Steel’s rivals in various lines of steel fabrication.160 The
plan of Judge Gary, the president of U.S. Steel, was not to form explicit price
agreements, but for each manufacturer simply to announce its intended prices
at dinners or meetings.161 Gary mistakenly thought this ingenious arrangement
would inoculate it against a Sherman Act challenge.
In extensive testimony, executives testified that they “assembled” and “de-
clared purposes as to prices,” then “left, each relying upon the other that that
price would be observed by them,”162 at least until “we found reason to change
it,” in which case “we would notify our competitors, or talk with them about
it, when another meeting would be held and conditions discussed.”163 Based
on these and similar passages (and evidence of the firms’ pricing following
the meetings) the court found that, even though “there was no positive and
expressed obligation; [and] no formal words of contract were used . . . most of
those who took part in these meetings went away knowing that prices had
been named and feeling bound to maintain them until they saw good reason to
do otherwise[.]”164 The court added that “[t]he final test, we think, is the ob-
ject and the effect of the arrangement, and both the object and effect were to
maintain prices, at least to a considerable degree.”165 The testimony was not
on the subject of specific statements in a single conversation, but a summary
of conversations at multiple meetings of a committee. Nevertheless, the testi-
160 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 154 (D.N.J. 1915) (“These dinners—
which were business meetings with a social aspect—began in November, 1907, and were held at
irregular intervals during the next 15 months, . . . . [and were followed by] committee meetings,
also with some other gatherings, which were held infrequently until early in 1911.”), aff’d, 251
U.S. 417 (1920).
161 Id. at 158–59 (“I stated distinctly * * * at that time that, as they all understood, we could not
make any agreement, express or implied, directly or indirectly, which bound us to maintain
prices or restrict territory or output; it must leave us free to do as we pleased, and must rely upon
a disposition of all others to do what they considered fair and right and for the best interests, not
only of themselves, but all others who had any interest in that or any other work.”).
162 Id. at 159.
163 Id. at 160.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 160–61. For further discussion, see William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the
Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597 (2009).
380 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83
mony is at the direct end of our spectrum, at least as to the meetings, because
witnesses with first-hand knowledge unambiguously described the operation
of Gary’s scheme. Managers described the gist of the private communications
of pricing intentions by other managers, with no suggestion by defendant of a
legitimate purpose.
D. GUILTY PLEAS AND OTHER ADMISSIONS
Guilty pleas, of course, establish the pleader’s guilt, but it is less clear what
they mean for other alleged conspirators. In general, a guilty plea by one de-
fendant is inadmissible in a criminal case as substantive evidence of the guilt
of an alleged co-conspirator.166 Nevertheless, a guilty plea may be relevant in
follow-on civil cases involving the same conduct.167 A recent decision held
that guilty pleas by officers of one corporate defendant were part of a pattern
of allegations of contacts between rivals that the court characterized as direct
evidence of a conspiracy with two other corporate defendants.168 But courts
“generally will limit the use of a guilty plea to the specific conduct admitted,
and will not permit, ‘if there, then here’ arguments to prove other
conspiracies.”169
Less formal admissions by a defendant might also constitute direct evi-
dence.170 For example, in a recent case, the complaint alleged that an execu-
tive of one of the plaintiff’s two primary rivals told the plaintiff that he was
“in communications” with other rivals to join “in the agreement to block”
independent firms like the plaintiff’s from access to the market, and another
executive of the same rival told the plaintiff on a different occasion that the
two rivals had “agreed to ‘lock you and the other parties out.’”171 The court
denied a motion to dismiss, finding that “[t]hese allegations straightforwardly
suffice” because they are “direct-evidence allegations of the agreement: taken
as true, the fact that two of Defendants’ executives admitted an agreement to
block [the plaintiff] and other integrators from accessing dealer data shows
166 United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1994).
167 In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (guilty pleas in prior cases raised an inference of agreement in the instant case).
168 In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
169 PROOF OF CONSPIRACY, supra note 7, at 65; In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust
Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding allegations of conspiracy insufficient
where “the defendants plead[ed] guilty to criminal conspiracy charges [but] those charges in-
volved conduct on a different trade route and amounted to a conspiracy to unlawfully raise
prices, while this case involves conspiracy claims of predatory pricing”).
170 See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner,
J.) (suggesting that direct evidence “would usually take the form of an admission by an employee
of one of the conspirators, that officials of the defendants had met and agreed explicitly on the
terms of a conspiracy to raise price”).
171 In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931, 950–51 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
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directly the existence of such an agreement. No further inference is
required.”172
IV. “PROXIES FOR DIRECT EVIDENCE”: COMMUNICATIONS
SUGGESTING A TRADITIONAL CONSPIRACY
Courts use the term direct evidence to describe a variety of forms evidence
(and allegations) with the common characteristic that, if believed, they require
very few inferences to establish a fact in issue. The classification of evidence
of a Sherman Act agreement as direct is a matter both of its relative clarity
and how completely it represents the scope of the alleged agreement. Only the
most complete and unambiguous evidence—recordings, testimony, or docu-
ments, for example—will usually satisfy Matsushita by itself. A few courts
call evidence further down the continuum “weak direct evidence” or some-
thing equally indefinite.
Still more ambiguous evidence or less complete evidence of communica-
tions is circumstantial evidence of the alleged agreement, but it still can pro-
vide a basis for denial of a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. As one
court recognized, even if “no inferences are required from direct evidence to
establish a fact,” it does not follow “that all circumstantial evidence should be
treated alike.”173 Matsushita, the court went on, did not distinguish direct and
circumstantial evidence, it only required the plaintiff to produce evidence of
agreement that was “sufficiently unambiguous,”174 which is true of both direct
evidence and strong circumstantial evidence.175 This language suggests that
172 Id. at 951; see also W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 100 (3d
Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff hospital’s allegation that a defendant insurer admitted an
agreement with a defendant hospital to drive plaintiff out of business, and that the defendant
hospital had sent letter to the insurer warning it not to give any assistance to the plaintiff were
“allegations of direct evidence” that were “sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on the agree-
ment element”).
173 Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir.
1993).
174 Id. (citation omitted).
175 The plaintiff in Petruzzi’s had produced tapes that suggested one rival was trying to per-
suade a rival to “play by the rules.” Id. at 1236; see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Anti-
trust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (statements that do not qualify as direct
evidence “are not to be disregarded because of their ambiguity”); In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Anti-
trust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Even if . . . there was some ambiguity in
the admissions, they are at a minimum ‘highly suggestive of the existence’ [of an] agreement to
block [plaintiff] from accessing dealer data and thus out of the market.”); Louis Kaplow, Direct
Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449, 488
(2011) (“[O]nce one moves past crisp, smoking-gun internal evidence (e.g., a document referring
to the meeting at the Sands Hotel on April 7, 2010 at which a firm’s vice president discussed and
agreed with counterparties Smith from Rival 1 and Jones from Rival 2 to raise prices on May 1,
2010, from 100 to 120), one begins to enter the territory where one is also employing other
evidence in attempting to make the requisite inference.”).
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the range of clarity and completeness of evidence of agreement extends into
the category of circumstantial evidence.
In this Part, I focus on this category of circumstantial evidence sufficient to
avoid summary judgment. Some courts refer to these plus factors as “proxies
for direct evidence of agreement.”176 The phrase suggests courts are looking
for evidence of suspicious communications among rivals, in addition to the
usual economic evidence of oligopoly behavior. As the last Part illustrates,
forms of unambiguous representations of the formation and terms of the al-
leged agreement are the most typical instances of direct evidence. And the
same factors that guide the classification of those forms of evidence as direct,
and the determination of their sufficiency, also guide decisions on the suffi-
ciency of circumstantial evidence of similar forms of communications.
Plus factors are categories of economic and noneconomic circumstantial
evidence of agreement. In cases involving oligopolies, most of the plus factors
that show that an agreement is possible—market concentration, identical con-
duct, homogeneous products, and actions of rivals contrary to their individual
self-interest, for example—are not enough by themselves to raise a plausible
inference of agreement, because they only “restate interdependence,” as
courts have said repeatedly, quoting Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise.177 All
of those factors are present if the defendants are acting interdependently,
using publicly available information, as the passage from Valspar quoted in
Part I illustrates.178 Consequently, courts say the most important plus factor is
“evidence suggesting a traditional conspiracy,” which might include “proof
that the defendants got together and exchanged assurances of common action
or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no meetings, conversations,
or exchanged documents are shown.”179 The category is problematic, because
it seems circular—“traditional conspiracy” is another term for the ultimate
176 The phrase originated in In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir.
2004) (“Existence of these plus factors tends to ensure that courts punish ‘concerted action’—an
actual agreement—instead of the ‘unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.’ In other
words, the factors serve as proxies for direct evidence of an agreement.” (citation omitted)).
177 White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 581 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that “many so-
called plus factors simply ‘demonstrate that a given market is chronically non-competitive,’
without helping to explain whether agreement or conscious parallelism is the cause.”) (citation
omitted). The court quoted an earlier edition of 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1434c1, at 276–77 (4th ed. 2017) (observing that these sorts of plus factors
“restate interdependence”). See also Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d
185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (same).
178 See supra text accompanying note 15.
179 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 193 (quoting In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d
383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015)); id. at 193 (citation omitted). See also In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust
Litig., MDL No. 2437 &13-MD-2437, 2019 WL 3254090, at *27 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2019)
(“[T]raditional conspiracy evidence ends up becoming the most critical plus factor in cases of
oligopolies.”).
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issue of agreement, so it seems to say the decisive evidence of agreement is
evidence of agreement. But I argue here the concept of direct evidence, and
the forms of direct evidence described in the last Part, guide application of
this category of circumstantial evidence.
Courts looking for evidence of traditional conspiracy focus on whether
there is noneconomic evidence of the communications that formed the agree-
ment—evidence that the defendants “got together” in the broad sense of using
private communications to form an agreement.180 Only certain communica-
tions suggest a traditional conspiracy because the courts recognize that oligo-
polists have legitimate (or at least non-conspiratorial) means or reasons to
communicate. Public announcements to the market, for example, can inform
rivals, but they are so central to the market mechanism, that courts will only
rarely find it suspicious.181 “Opportunities to collude” privately at trade associ-
ation meetings (unless closely correlated with price increases) are usually in-
sufficient, without more, to raise an inference that the rivals actually took the
opportunity, because the communications in those meetings could well have
been on legitimate subjects for trade association discussions.182 Courts also
often find elaborate information exchange programs insufficient, if they share
180 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 203 n.15. Economists have proposed that some patterns of economic
evidence are sufficient to raise an inference of conspiracy, but courts have not been receptive.
See, e.g., Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 478, 499–500 (S.D.N.Y.
2015). For earlier discussion, see Robert A. Milne & Jack E. Pace III, Conspiratologists at the
Gate: The Scope of Expert Testimony on the Subject of Conspiracy in a Sherman Act Case,
ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 36, 39–40 (summarizing cases rejecting expert testimony on agree-
ment). See also City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“As circumstantial evidence, [expert] testimony need not prove the plaintiffs’ case . . . [it] must
merely constitute one piece of the puzzle that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the
jury.”).
181 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“[E]vidence that the alleged conspirators were aware of each other’s prices, before announcing
their own prices, is nothing more than a restatement of conscious parallelism, which is not
enough to show an antitrust conspiracy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Plasma-De-
rivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding
statements during analyst calls that the firm is “in a very good position to see stable growth in
this business going forward over the next three to five years” and that “the industry [is] now
heading to a much more predictable phase of stability” did not propose an agreement). The same
goes for intra-firm communications. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 200 (observing that “these e-mails
show that the competitors were aware of the phenomenon of conscious parallelism and imple-
mented pricing strategies in response to it”).
182 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 199 (refusing to assume that, because the “TDMA meetings brought
the competitors together . . . one should assume that they used the meetings to conspire”). But cf.
In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“While
more specific detail regarding interfirm communications may be required . . . their allegations
regarding defendants’ participation in industry groups and gatherings contribute to a finding that
they have plausibly alleged that these Defendants had an opportunity to conspire.”); In re Broiler
Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 799–800 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding allegations of
“suspicious timing of important industry conferences” in relation to production cuts supported
inference of agreement).
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only retrospective, aggregated data.183 Agreement requires private communi-
cations about the future—promises or statements of intention.
In Valspar, the majority’s willingness to explain away evidence of commu-
nications led the dissenting judge to complain that “[t]oday’s decision could
easily be read to require direct evidence of an agreement in an oligopoly/
antitrust case despite the fact that neither our prior jurisprudence (nor the Su-
preme Court’s) has ever required such evidence.”184 The majority responded
defensively that “our caselaw does not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff
can defeat summary judgment with only circumstantial evidence in the Sec-
tion 1 oligopoly context,” but that evidence must include “non-economic evi-
dence of an actual agreement between the conspirators, and not just a
restatement of the interdependent economic conduct that we must accept in an
oligopolistic marketplace.”185 By implication, the court required circumstantial
evidence of communications that suggested agreement, even though falling
short of the categories of direct evidence described in the last Part. I suggest
courts’ concept of direct evidence, even in the absence of direct evidence in
the record, provides the measure of those sorts of communications.
When courts evaluate the strength of inferences from noneconomic circum-
stantial evidence using the plus factors framework, they rely on an implicit
understanding of what direct evidence of an agreement among the defendants
would look like. Direct evidence represents the necessary communications
unambiguously and completely; noneconomic circumstantial evidence of
communications is a proxy for that. Once again, we can think of a continuum
of clarity and completeness to understand the process of classification. As one
court said, “[A]nalysis of inter-firm communications is not mechanical, and
the probative value of such evidence depends on the participants, the informa-
183 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 199 (finding defendants’ Global Statistics Program was benign be-
cause it “aggregated and blinded ‘members’ monthly sales, production, and inventory data
worldwide,’ but never collected price information”); Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F.
Supp. 2d 603, 639–41 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (finding direct sharing of nurses’ wage information was
insufficient to raise an inference of per se illegal price fixing, although it did establish an agree-
ment to share information that might be anticompetitive under the rule of reason).
184 Valspar, 873 F.3d at 212 (Stengel, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 203 n.15. Two other courts in the Titanium Dioxide litigation, viewing essentially the
same record as the one in Valspar, found the evidence of communications sufficient to plausibly
suggest agreement. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 16-cv-
04865-BLF, 2019 WL 3804667, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019) (“While the Court agrees that
the evidence does not establish direct communications about pricing, the Court also agrees with
the Haley Paint court that evidence regarding the alleged conspirators’ communications, is ‘the
kind of circumstantial evidence that, when viewed in conjunction with the massive record in this
case, could lead a jury to reasonably infer a conspiracy in restraint of trade.’”) (citing In re
Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 830 (D. Md. 2013)). See also id. at *1
(finding “that an antitrust plaintiff’s burden to oppose summary judgment under Third Circuit
law as articulated in Valspar is far more onerous than under Ninth Circuit law”).
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tion exchanged, and the context—specifically, the connection between the
content and the price-fixing conspiracy alleged.”186
Consider first the most ambiguous noneconomic evidence, evidence courts
find insufficient to suggest agreement.187 A common ground for rejecting evi-
dence of communication even as circumstantial evidence is that it is too am-
biguous to suggest anything, particularly by comparison with direct evidence.
One court, for example, found that plaintiff’s evidence of communication not
only “lacked the clarity of the direct evidence proffered in other antitrust
cases,” it was “at best evidence of an opportunity to conspire, not of concerted
action.”188 Or in Text Messaging, Judge Posner found emails of an employee
that referred to a recent price increase as “col[l]usive” were neither direct
evidence189 nor sufficient circumstantial evidence, because (like the economic
evidence) it could easily have reflected lawful tacit collusion.190 Documents in
corporate defendants’ files may also refer to “understandings,” “rules,” or
other words suggesting coordination among rivals.191 But, as Louis Kaplow
has pointed out, references like these can often be interpreted as indications of
lawful tacit collusion.192 Documents may obliquely refer to communications
among rivals, but the meaning of the communications’ content is unknown,193
186 In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures and Options Trading Litig., 328 F. Supp. 3d
217, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). See also Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 899 F.3d 87,
113 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that “each defendant’s internal and interfirm communications, when
properly viewed in the setting of each defendant’s conduct and industry conditions, equally sup-
port inferences of competition and conspiracy”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019).
187 See, e.g., Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding emails were not direct evidence of agreement because they “actually reveal disagree-
ment among” the defendants; “common dislike is not the same as an explicit understanding to
conspire”); Resco Prods., Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Group Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 406, 419–20 (W.D.
Pa. 2016) (finding defendants’ votes on proposals of export quotas were not direct evidence of
conspiracy), appeal dismissed, No. 16-1412, 2017 WL 4012694 (3d Cir. June 16, 2017); In re K-
Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 01-cv-1652 (SRC) (CLW), 2016 WL 755623, at *20 (D.N.J. Feb. 25,
2016) (finding bilateral agreements between drug companies were not direct evidence of a hub
and spoke agreement to exclude generics); U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co., No. 04-
5182, 2009 WL 89692, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2009) (finding a memorandum from Scotts to a
distributor stating that those who are not “in sync” with Scott’s strategy “traveled the road of the
dinosaurs” was not direct evidence because it required an inference that it referred to “a history
of terminations by Scotts of relationships with distributors who were unwilling to follow Scotts’
pricing preferences”), aff’d on other grounds, 367 F. App’x 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
188 Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 53 (3d Cir. 2007).
189 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2015).
190 Id. at 872–79.
191 InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[C]ases require that
direct evidence of an illegal agreement be established with much greater clarity.”). Id. at 163 (“A
vague reference to ‘rules’ is insufficiently explicit and requires ample inferences of illegal ac-
tions that would constitute a conspiracy among Cowen and other broker-dealers in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
192 See KAPLOW, supra note 21, at 34.
193 In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 982 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (logs
showing only fact of calls between rivals “standing alone is as consistent with lawful conduct
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or they relate to lawful subjects.194 In other instances they can be interpreted
as referring to benign independent conduct195 or to lawful vertical
agreements.196
In other cases, however, courts find noneconomic evidence of communica-
tions sufficient to raise an inference of agreement, even if it falls short of the
clarity or completeness necessary for direct evidence of the agreement. As
Judge Posner said in High Fructose, direct evidence “is evidence tantamount
to an acknowledgment of guilt,” while circumstantial evidence “is everything
else including ambiguous statements,” which “are be disregarded because of
their ambiguity; most cases are constructed out of a tissue of such statements
and other circumstantial evidence.”197 In Flat Glass, the case that coined the
term “proxies for direct evidence,” the court pointed to a pattern of economic
and noneconomic evidence, including evidence that one rival faxed to another
“a copy of a planned future increase that it had not announced publicly, [the
recipient] announced an identical increase before [the sender], and the rest of
the flat glass producers followed with identical price increases.”198 The court
found that the evidence “in its totality, [was] sufficient to go to the jury.”199
There are other examples.  In Toys “R” Us, the court found there was “di-
rect evidence of communications” between Toys “R” Us and each of its toy
suppliers that provided a key ground for inferring a per se illegal horizontal
(e.g., a call to discuss purchase of a Defendant’s flexible foam plant) as it is with collusion (e.g.,
a call to discuss coordination of the next round of [price increases]).”).
194 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1069 (S.D. Ind.
2001) (finding emails relating to a “clearly legal” issue could not reasonably be interpreted a
direct evidence an agreement to refuse to deal); Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare,
Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226–27 (4th Cir. 2012) (minutes of a meeting of an insurer and its medical
advisory panel were not direct evidence of a conspiracy to impose policy coverage caps that
injured the plaintiff). See also supra note 28.
195 Corr Wireless Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. AT&T, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 789, 805 n.13 (N.D. Miss.
2012) (finding comments that there may be people in a standards-setting organization who would
object to new wireless standards were not direct (or circumstantial) evidence of a conspiracy to
delay the standards, because they not state or “infer” that “concerted action by any of Defendants
caused or threatened such alleged delay”).
196 In re Pool Prod. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 158 F. Supp. 3d 544, 553, 570–71 (E.D. La.)
(finding (among other communications) an email stating that three manufacturers had “all agreed
to the $20K freight minimum with NO exceptions [and] I need to know if anyone does not
comply” was not direct evidence of an agreement among manufacturers because it could have
referred to agreements between each manufacturer and Pool; nor was it sufficient when consid-
ered the other circumstantial evidence), appeal dismissed, No. 16-30855 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2016).
197 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2002). Posner
found such a tissue in a lengthy analysis of economic and non-economic evidence, including
statements that could suggest agreement, even though the “evidence is not conclusive by any
means—there are alternative interpretations of every bit of it.” Id. at 663.
198 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 369 (3d Cir. 2004).
199 Id.
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agreement among the toy companies to boycott warehouse clubs.200  In Sulfu-
ric Acid, the court rejected the defendants’ effort to “fault Plaintiffs for failing
to produce direct evidence revealing anything more than arms-length negotia-
tions and independent make-buy decisions,” finding instead “circumstantial
evidence tending to show that Defendants’ negotiations went beyond com-
merce in acid to produce a cleverly disguised conspiracy”201 to form purchase
arrangements and reduce capacity. And in Polyurethane Foam, the court re-
viewed the plaintiff’s voluminous evidence of communications, finding some
benign202 but others forming “a fairly dense web of communications between
high-level competitor employees, almost all of who[m] had pricing author-
ity.”203 Some communications included drafts of price increase announce-
ments.204 This evidence of communication, along with the economic
circumstantial evidence, supported the denial of a motion for summary judg-
ment. Even though it did not represent the content of the communications, the
circumstances permitted the necessary inference.205
200 Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000). The FTC found, after an
administrative adjudication, that Toys “R” Us had “orchestrated a horizontal agreement among
its key suppliers to boycott [warehouse] clubs” that threatened its market position in toy retailing.
Id. at 932. Among the voluminous circumstantial evidence was one executive’s testimony that
“‘[w]e communicated to our vendors that we were communicating with all our key suppliers,
and . . . made a point to tell each of the vendors that we spoke to that we would be talking to our
other key suppliers.’” Id.
201 In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 859 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
202 In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 983–86 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
203 Id. at 984.
204 See also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding sufficient “an internal memorandum of defendant . . . entitled ‘Price Escalation
Proposal,’ [stating] ‘the industry has generally agreed to informally keep its prices in line with
CPI or CPI plus 1 to 2%,’” because “the interpretation of ambiguous documentary evidence of
collusion is for the jury”); Garot Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 772
F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding sufficient documents referring to “our agreement” and
“Memorandum of Understanding”).
205 In re Polyurethane, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 986 (“[A] jury could find that many more Defendant
communications lack . . . innocuous context.”). See also In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust
Litig., 394 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (denying dismissal where complaint alleged
hundreds of phone and text conversations between generic drug manufacturers); Tera Group Inc.
v. Citigroup Inc., No. 17 Civ. 4302, 2019 WL 3457242, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2019) (deny-
ing dismissal where the complaint alleged, among other plus factors, “significant communica-
tions that, in combination with allegations of common language and techniques used by
Defendants in carrying out the boycott, contribute to the plausibility of the inference that the
alleged parallel conduct flowed from a preceding agreement rather than unilateral action”); In re
Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding
“numerous inter-firm communications among the alleged conspirators in the first half of 1999”
were plus factors, particularly where defendants “failed to offer a compelling rationale for why it
would disclose such information.”); In re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL
1368(CLB), 2006 WL 1317023, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (“While some information might
have been gathered through innocuous customer chatter . . . there is evidence of direct, deliberate
inter-corporate communications, such as the conversation which took place at the trade show
[that one participant] characterized as ‘inappropriate.’”).
388 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83
In the foregoing cases, documentary and testimonial evidence that did not
represent the agreement with the clarity and completeness we see in the cases
described in the last Part were still sufficiently suggestive, together with other
circumstantial evidence, to raise a jury issue.  A similar spectrum is apparent
in cases involving voice recordings of alleged conspirators. High-quality
voice recordings can be direct evidence of agreement, as we saw in the last
Part, but less clear recordings may be circumstantial evidence206 or inadmissi-
ble.207 In United States v. Andreas, for example, the court affirmed the convic-
tion of the president of Archer Daniels Midland in the lysine price-fixing
conspiracy based in part on recordings made by the problematic government
informant, Mark Whitacre.208 Although the court did not characterize the tapes
as direct evidence, it came close by holding that a “jury rationally could un-
derstand Andreas’ [recorded] words at this meeting only to indicate his
knowledge of, participation in and control of the entire plot”209 and that the
jury “apparently, and reasonably, considered insincere and facetious Andreas’
occasional statements that ADM would not do anything illegal at a time when
he was actively playing a vital role in achieving a criminal purpose.”210 Simi-
larly, in Petruzzi’s, the court found that secretly recorded tapes contained
enough references to conversations between rivals (urging one not to take
others’ accounts and referring to “play[ing] by the rules”), when considered
with other evidence, to raise a jury issue of agreement among two of the three
defendants.211
In some cases, the plaintiff has produced direct evidence of an agreement,
but not the one at issue in the case; for the latter conspiracy, the evidence may
be circumstantial. For example, in the last Part, we saw that written contracts
embodying the agreement at issue can be direct evidence of the entire agree-
ment. In other cases, plaintiffs may argue that superficially benign written
agreements should be considered circumstantial evidence of a separate, per se
206 See, e.g., Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., No. DKC 12-
0954, 2015 WL 4597529, at *10 (D. Md. July 6, 2015) (finding that “the telephone recording on
which [plaintiff] relies as direct evidence of concerted action is ambiguous, relies on inferences
of a conspiracy orchestrated by [defendant], and does not establish direct evidence of a group
boycott”).
207 Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heaveafil SDN. BHD., No. 3:98CV10-MU, 2001 WL 587858, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2001) (excluding audio recordings as inadequately authenticated and “largely
inaudible”).
208 United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000). On Whitacre, see id. (describing
Whitacre’s selective taping of price-fixing meetings); KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT 565
(2000) (“While he turned in the price-fixers, he also turned on the FBI and his subsequent em-
ployer . . . [and] was willing to inform on the failures and crimes—both real and imagined—of
everyone other than himself.”).
209 Andreas, 216 F.3d at 670.
210 Id.
211 Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1235–36 (3d
Cir. 1993).
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illegal oral agreement among the parties. As the Second Circuit reasoned, if a
soccer league challenged the U.S. Soccer Federation’s “Standards [defining
tiers of leagues] themselves—in totality—as violative of the antitrust laws,
then the USSF Board’s promulgation of them would constitute direct evidence
of § 1 concerted action in that undertaking,” but “for the clearly alleged over-
arching conspiracy to restrain competition in markets for top-and second-tier
men’s professional soccer leagues in North America, the promulgation of the
Standards is circumstantial evidence of that conspiracy.”212
If the proven conspiracy occurred in a geographic market different from the
one at issue, courts have usually found the distant conspiracy insufficiently
related in its purpose or actors to be probative.213 Other separate conspiracies
may be more relevant to the one at issue. If the defendants engaged in price
fixing in the same geographic area but in a different product market, courts
may find it relevant for limited purposes.214 Similarly, if there is direct evi-
dence that the defendants engaged in price fixing in the past, then courts may
find it is at least circumstantial evidence that the conspiracy continued into the
period at issue. In Therm-All, for example, the court found that direct evi-
dence of conspiratorial acts at the beginning of the statute of limitations pe-
riod was circumstantial evidence that the conspiracy continued.215
212 N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. United States Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 41 (2d Cir.
2018). See also In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (finding sufficient allegations that flash memory producers used a “‘web’ of cross-licens-
ing and joint venture agreements as a means to facilitate collusive behavior”; although “these
allegations may not expressly state that the . . . agreements themselves were illegal”—in which
case they would have been direct evidence of the conspiracy—“they nonetheless may be consid-
ered with the pleadings as a whole in determining the existence of a ‘plausible’ conspiracy”); In
re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 510, 535–36 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“[T]o the
extent the statements made by . . . executives refer to the 2015 written agreements . . . they
indicate that the aim of those agreements was to block third-party integrators.”).
213 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 595–96 (1986)
(“The ‘direct evidence’ on which the court relied was evidence of other combinations, not of a
predatory pricing conspiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in Japan pro-
vides little, if any, support for respondents’ claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market
does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another.”); In re Chocolate Confectionary
Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 405–07 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A conspiracy elsewhere, without more,
generally does not tend to prove a domestic conspiracy, especially when the conduct observed
domestically is just as consistent with lawful interdependence as with an antitrust conspiracy.”);
In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Allegations of anticompetitive
wrongdoing in Europe—absent any evidence of linkage between such foreign conduct and con-
duct here—is merely to suggest (in defendants’ words) that ‘if it happened there, it could have
happened here.’”).
214 United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Citric acid [direct]
evidence was admissible [in a prosecution for fixing the price of lysine] because it arose from a
series of transactions related to the lysine conspiracy and helped to explain the context of the
conspirator’s conduct shown in the numerous audio and video tapes presented at trial.”), aff’d,
216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000).
215 United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625, 636 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “[t]he jury
could have reasonably inferred that the conspiracy continued into the limitations period based
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The cases in this Part show the relevance of the concept of direct evidence
to the broader question of sufficiency of evidence, particularly the often-deci-
sive category of plus factors, “evidence of traditional conspiracy.” That appar-
ently circular question is best understood by analogy to the paradigm of direct
evidence—the courts’ understanding of what direct evidence of competitive
intentions or assurances look like in analogous cases. More ambiguous evi-
dence of the agreement in issue—for example evidence of unexplained com-
munications among rivals, or evidence of related agreements among rivals—
can be sufficient to defeat summary judgment if they suggest the communica-
tions of intent or assurance occurred.
V. CONCLUSION
Most would concede the standard definition of direct evidence—that it
proves the fact in issue “without inferences”—can’t be right. All proof of a
historical fact requires inference, so, by the standard definition, direct evi-
dence cannot exist. But direct evidence not only does exist as a legal category,
courts routinely use it to resolve whether there is sufficient evidence of agree-
ment, the most important issue in the most common form of antitrust
litigation.
I have argued that direct evidence of agreement represents the alleged
agreement well-nigh unambiguously and fully. Courts may also classify evi-
dence that less fully represents the agreement as direct evidence of some part
of the agreement or of an agreement among fewer than all the alleged conspir-
ators. More ambiguous evidence—like communications whose content is less
clear—may be circumstantial evidence of agreement. Still more ambiguous
evidence that suggests only lawful and benign conduct is insufficient or even
irrelevant.
Direct evidence of agreement is a diverse category. Courts have found that
a variety of forms or patterns of evidence are direct: writings that actually
embody or refer to the agreement at issue, recordings or transcripts of conspir-
atorial conversations, testimony (often immunized) of participants in the
agreement, and admissions by participants. These forms record, recall, or
summarize the communications that formed the agreement, or express the
terms of the agreement itself.
on” what the court described as “direct evidence that the participants were involved in conspira-
torial acts, i.e., the acts of setting prices at agreed-upon levels, [for one month] during the limita-
tions period”). See also United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 245 F. Supp. 74, 78 (E.D. Pa.
1965) (“Although there was no direct evidence of a conspiracy after May 31, 1957, there was
direct evidence from which a conspiracy could have been established prior to this date, from
which a continuing conspiracy past this date could have been inferred.”).
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Although direct evidence of agreement can be highly probative for a finder
of fact, it has special importance on pretrial and post-trial motions that chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a jury issue of agreement in
cases alleging per se offenses like price fixing or market allocation. To re-
solve that often decisive question of law, the court must assume all evidence
is true—a principle that means direct evidence will raise a jury issue of agree-
ment, or at least go a long way in that direction. The “if true” condition means
the court cannot assess credibility, so the case will likely have to go to trial,
where the defendant can challenge direct evidence by questioning its credibil-
ity or by offering conflicting evidence. More often, of course, the case will be
settled.
Admittedly, courts rarely find direct evidence of agreement.  Often, the
plaintiff contends it has direct evidence, but the court finds the evidence too
ambiguous—it requires too many inferences to prove agreement—to justify
the characterization. In other cases, courts begin the analysis of the evidence
by saying there is no direct evidence of agreement.  Only then do they con-
sider whether the circumstantial evidence “tends to exclude the possibility” of
lawful oligopoly conduct. Even in those cases, I argue in the last Part, the
ideal of direct evidence can still guide the evaluation of circumstantial evi-
dence of communications. The case law I have examined here is a library of
those analogies.

